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This paper describes a micro-founded DSGE model with endogenous growth that is used to 
analyse the macroeconomic impact of structural reforms in Europe. The new QUEST III 
model is a useful tool for analysing the costs and benefits of reforms in terms of concrete and 
quantifiable policy measures, in particular fiscal policy instruments such as taxes, benefits, 
subsidies and education expenditures, administrative costs faced by firms and regulatory 
indices. Our results confirm the beneficial effects on output and employment of skill-biased 
tax reforms, measures that improve the skill composition of the labour force, R&D subsidies, 
raising competition in final goods market, increased financial market integration and 
measures that remove entry barriers in certain markets. The model also allows us to examine 
the adjustment path and the time lags involved before these benefits can be reaped.  
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European Commission. Executive Summary 
 
The launch of the Lisbon Strategy in 2000 has started a lively debate on how to best design a 
strategy to achieve both higher growth and more employment and there has been a related 
discussion on how to best evaluate structural measures which have an impact on goods, 
labour and financial markets.  
 
It is widely recognised by now that knowledge investment is a key to economic growth and 
there is a link between the growth rate of technical progress and knowledge investment, both 
in the form of higher R&D spending or increased education expenditure. For example, the 
OECD (2003) estimates that increasing R&D by 0.1% points could increase GDP by about 
1.2%, while Fuente (2003) estimates that one year of additional education could raise GDP in 
the EU by 4 to 6%. However, it is also evident that it is not in the power of governments to 
increase R&D spending (of the private sector) directly. Instead one has to think about 
appropriate policies which induce firms to increase intangible investment. These can take a 
variety of forms, e. g. tax incentives, changes in market structure, supporting public R&D 
efforts, increasing the pool of qualified R&D personnel etc.  
 
This paper proposes to use a Dynamic Stochastic General Equilibrium (DSGE) model which 
captures both investment in tangibles and intangibles (R&D), and which also disaggregates 
employment into various skill categories, as a tool for analysing the effects of particular 
policy measures. The framework that we adopt is the Jones (1995, 2005) extension of the 
Romer (1990) endogenous growth model, which uses a variety approach for modelling 
knowledge investment. DSGE models are particularly well-suited for this task since they 
capture nominal and real rigidities in goods and labour markets by modelling these markets as 
imperfectly competitive. This also allows us to look at competition-enhancing policies.  
 
The model set up in this paper is sufficiently detailed to be able to address the main reform 
areas that are discussed within the EU's comprehensive strategy of structural reforms. More 
specifically we use the model to analyse the following reforms:  increasing the employment of 
low-skilled workers, changing the skill composition of the labour force, fiscal measures for 
increasing knowledge investment, removing entry barriers and administrative burdens in 
certain markets and addressing financial market imperfections. Our aim is to explicitly model 
the reforms in terms of concrete and quantifiable policy measures, in particular fiscal policy 
instruments such as taxes, benefits, subsidies and education expenditures, administrative costs 
faced by firms (for both entrants and incumbents) and regulatory indices. For each policy 
measure a comprehensive set of  macroeconomic indicators is presented, showing how 
particular reforms impact on growth, employment, the composition of investment and skill 
premia in the short, medium and long run, thus providing insights into the transmission 
mechanisms of various structural and fiscal measures.  
 
The model has been used to analyse selected structural policies published in the Annual 
Progress Report of the Commission and is currently used to analyse policies as put forward in 
the recent Communication from the Commission proposing a European Economic Recovery 
Plan in  response to the financial crisis. The model feeds into the policy making process as a 
tool which can be used to assess concrete policy initiatives designed to counter adverse effects 




  1Introduction 
 
Designing policies to foster economic growth and job creation in the European Union is one 
of the principal goals of the Lisbon Strategy for Growth and Jobs. Since the initiation of the 
Lisbon Strategy in 2000 there has been a lively debate on how to best design a strategy to 
achieve both higher growth and more employment. This has become even more critical in the 
recent financial crisis which is expected not only to lower actual growth but also to reduce the 
potential growth rate in the medium term
1. However, as emphasised in a review of Lisbon 
related research the Commission (European Commission, 2005) states: "…at this stage we 
have only a partial view of the impact of specific reforms and we not yet fully understand the 
interactions between the different reforms envisaged in the Lisbon Strategy."  Also Sapir 
(2007) points out that there are large deficiencies in the methodology to evaluate structural 
reforms. In particular he stresses that structural reforms are essentially microeconomic policy 
measures, which implies that without a clear view on how particular measures affect goods, 
labour and financial markets it will be difficult to assess their impact on growth and 
employment. Sapir (2007) states in this context: "…using a macro-model to assess the impact 
of structural reforms requires a careful modelling of the intermediate microeconomic effects." 
This poses a challenge to model builders. In this paper we want to make a step in the direction 
of dealing with this challenge.  
 
Standard modern macro-economic models, so called Dynamic Stochastic General Equilibrium 
(DSGE) models, go some way in the direction of meeting the requirement of micro 
foundations and also typically model imperfections in goods and labour markets. DSGE 
models try to capture nominal and real rigidities in goods and labour markets by modelling 
these markets as imperfectly competitive. Nevertheless, standard models still lack sufficient 
detail to make a direct link between concrete reform efforts and market outcomes. For 
example it is typical in macro studies of the impact of structural reforms to analyse reforms by 
giving shocks to mark-ups and TFP (see for example Bayoumi et al. (2004) and studies based 
on CGE models). Such exercises are certainly useful if one is interested in understanding 
productivity and employment differences between two countries with different levels of 
mark-ups and TFP. However, it is less useful in a policy context as long as one cannot link  
these variables to policy measures. Another weak point of existing macro models is that they 
are not detailed enough to address specific policy areas. This becomes immediately clear 
when one looks at the main reform areas. For example, the employment rate in Europe differs 
significantly across skill groups. Therefore a policy of increasing the employment rate must 
devise measures to increase the demand and supply of low skilled workers or change the 
composition of the labour force. Analysing labour market policies therefore requires a 
disaggregation of the labour market, which is not a common practice in macro models. One of 
the most prominent Lisbon targets is to increase R&D expenditure to 3% of GDP. It is widely 
recognised by now that knowledge investment is a key to economic growth and there is a link 
between the growth rate of technical progress and R&D spending. However, it is also clear 
that it is not in the power of governments to increase R&D spending (of the private sector) 
directly but one has to think about appropriate policies which induce firms to increase 
intangible investment. These can take a variety of forms, e. g. tax incentives, changes in 
market structure, supporting public R&D efforts, increasing the pool of qualified R&D 
personnel etc.. What is required is a disaggregation of investment into tangibles and 
                                                 
1 In response to the financial crisis, the Commission is proposing a detailed EU recovery framework, under the 
umbrella of the Lisbon strategy for growth and jobs, bringing together a series of targeted short term initiatives 
designed to help counter adverse effects of the financial crisis on the wider economy and adapting the medium to 
long term measures of the Lisbon strategy to take account of the crisis. 
  2intangibles which is not standard practice in macro models.  Such a disaggregation is 
conceptually much more demanding then for example skill disaggregation of the labour force, 
because these two types of goods have fundamentally different economic characteristics. 
Physical capital is a conventional good. Basically this means two things. First, the use of a 
piece of fixed capital by one firm precludes its use by another firm, i.e. it is rivalrous. Second, 
the quantity of output produced can be modelled within a standard production function 
framework with constant returns-to-scale. Knowledge capital is different in both dimensions. 
It usually comes in the form of a design for the production of a new good. In contrast to 
physical capital it is non-rivalrous (see Romer,1990), i.e. a firm which is in the possession of 
a new design cannot automatically preclude other firms from using it and there can be 
knowledge spillovers. Also, once a design has been created it can be used in production for as 
large a quantity as is required by the market without duplicating the design. Thus knowledge 
capital takes the form of a sunk cost for the firm and production becomes increasing returns-
to-scale. This not only has technological implications but also has consequences for market 
structures which are compatible with this technology. Endogenous growth models as 
pioneered by Romer (1990), and further developed by Jones (1995) and Aghion and Howitt 
(1998), provide the conceptual framework to deal with these issues. This is also the 
framework we use in this paper. As implied by these models, striking an adequate balance 
between efficiency and competition becomes a complex issue. 
 
In this paper we make an attempt to set up a model that is sufficiently detailed to be able to 
address the main reform areas that are discussed within the EU's comprehensive strategy of 
structural reforms. More specifically we use the model to analyse the following reforms:   
increasing the employment of low-skilled workers, changing the skill composition of the 
labour force, increasing knowledge investment, removing entry barriers in certain markets 
and addressing financial market imperfections. Our aim is to explicitly model the reforms in 
terms of concrete and quantifiable policy measures, in particular fiscal policy instruments 
such as taxes, benefits, subsidies and education expenditures, administrative costs faced by 
firms (for both entrants and incumbents) and regulatory indices. This makes the model a 
useful tool for analysing the costs and benefits of structural reforms, but it can also be 
usefully applied to address questions concerning the quality of public finances.    
 
The model we use in this paper is an extension of the QUEST III model with endogenous 
growth. The new QUEST III model is a global DSGE model employed in the Directorate-
General Economic and Financial Affairs of the European Commission for quantitative policy 
analysis. This model belongs to the new class of micro-founded DSGE models that are now 
widely used in economic policy institutions
2. Equations in these models are explicitly derived 
from intertemporal optimisation under technological, institutional and budgetary constraints 
and the model incorporates nominal, real and financial frictions in order to fit the data (Ratto 
et al., 2008). The model employs the product variety framework proposed by Dixit and 
Stiglitz (1977) and applies the Jones (1995) semi-endogenous growth framework to explicitly 
model the underlying development of R&D.  
 
Our paper can be compared to Bayoumi et al. (2004), which uses the IMF's Global Economy 
Model GEM to analyse the macroeconomic benefits from increasing competition in euro area 
labour and product markets to US levels. Based on empirically estimated mark-ups for the 
euro area and the US, they find that lowering price and wage mark-ups to US levels could 
raise output per capita by about 12 ½ percent and close about half the observed per-capita 
                                                 
2 See for example the International Monetary Fund's Global Economy Model (Bayoumi et al., 2004) and the 
European Central Bank's New Area-Wide Model  (Coenen et al., 2007). 
  3output gap between the two regions. Coenen et al. (2007) employ the ECB's New Area-Wide 
Model NAWM to examine the effects of reducing the euro area tax wedge to levels prevailing 
in the US and find that this would result in an increase in hours worked and output of more 
than 10 percent. In our paper we investigate a wider range of policies and we use an 
endogenous growth framework
3. We find that the effect of reducing price mark-ups is not 
unambiguous and depends on the sector in which it occurs. In our intermediate goods sector 
mark-ups cover the costs associated with acquiring a patent when entering the market, and 
reducing mark-ups can have a detrimental impact on growth and employment if it reduces 
entry of new firms. Concerning tax reforms, Coenen et al. consider reductions in the overall 
tax burden that are offset by changes in government transfers to households, while we look at 
the effects of a shift in the tax burden from labour tax to consumption tax.  
 
The paper is organised as follows. Section 1 contains a detailed description of the model. 
Section 2 discusses calibration and estimation of structural parameters. Section 3 then shows 







The model economy is populated by households, final and intermediate goods producing 
firms, a research industry, a monetary and a fiscal authority
4. In the final goods sector firms 
produce differentiated goods which are imperfect substitutes for goods produced abroad. Final 
good producers use a composite of domestic and imported intermediate goods and three types 
of labour - (low-, medium-, and high-skilled). Households buy the patents of designs 
produced by the R&D sector and license them to the intermediate goods producing firms. The 
intermediate sector is composed of monopolistically competitive firms which produce 
intermediate products from rented capital input using the designs licensed from the household 
sector. The production of new designs takes place in research labs, employing high skilled 
labour and making use of the existing stock of domestic and foreign ideas. Technological 





The household sector consists of a continuum of households  . A share (1-ε) of these 
households are not liquidity constrained and indexed by 
[ 1 , 0 ∈ h
[
]
] ε − 1 , 0 ∈ i .  They have access to 
financial markets where they can buy and sell domestic and foreign assets (government 
bonds), accumulate physical capital which they rent out to the intermediate sector, and they 
also buy the patents of designs produced by the R&D sector and license them to the 
intermediate goods producing firms. Non-liquidity constrained household members offer 
                                                 
3 In another paper (Roeger et al., 2008) we use the model to identify possible sources for the productivity gap 
between the EU and the US and look at policies which could help to close this gap. The framework allows us to 
explain differences in productivity and R&D spending levels in terms of differences in taxation, subsidies to 
R&D, mark ups in labour and goods markets, entry barriers, efficiency of the R&D sector and the skill 
composition of the labour force.  
4 The model can be used in a one-country, open-economy version and it can also be extended to more regions 
(e.g. Euro Area and non Euro Area blocks of the EU, US, Asia, major oil-exporters). Individual European Union 
member states can also be modelled separately in interaction with the rest of the EU. 
  4medium- and high-skilled  labour services indexed by  . The remaining share ε of 
households is liquidity constrained and indexed by 
{ H M s , ∈
[ 1 , 1
}




. These households cannot 
trade in financial and physical assets and consume their disposable income each period. 
Members of liquidity constrained households offer low-skilled labour services only. For each 
skill group we assume that both types of households supply differentiated labour services to 
unions which act as wage setters in monopolistically competitive labour markets. The unions 
pool wage income and distribute it in equal proportions among their members. Nominal 
rigidity in wage setting is introduced by assuming that households face adjustment costs for 
changing wages.  
 
 
1.1.1  Non liquidity constrained households 
 
Each non liquidity constrained household maximise an intertemporal utility function in 
consumption and leisure subject to a budget constraint. These households makes decisions 
about consumption ( ), labour supply ( ), investments into domestic and foreign financial 
assets (  and  ), the purchases of investment good ( ), the renting of physical capital 
stock ( ), the corresponding degree of capacity utilisation ( ), the purchases of new 
patents from the R&D sector ( ), and the licensing of existing patents ( ), and receives 



























, 5, transfer income from the government 
( ) ,and interest income (i ). Hence, non-liquidity constrained households face 




t t i   and
                                                 
5 Notice, households only make a decision about the level of employment but there is no distinction on the part 
of households between unemployment and non participation. It is assumed that the government makes a decision 
how to classify the non-working part of the population into unemployed and non-participants. The non -
participation rate NPART must therefore be seen as a policy variable characterising the generosity of the benefit 
system.  
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The budget constraints are written in real terms with all prices and wages normalized with Pt, 
the price of domestic final goods. All firms of the economy are owned by non liquidity 
constrained households who share the total profit of the final and intermediate sector firms, 
and  , where n and At denote the number of firms in the final and 
intermediate sector respectively. As shown by the budget constraints, all households pay   
wage income taxes and   capital income taxes less tax credits (τ
K and τ
A) and depreciation 
allowances ( δ
K and 
A) after their earnings on physical capital and patents. There is no 
perfect arbitrage between different types of assets. When taking a position in the international 
























(.) F B Γ  which depends on 
the economy-wide net holdings of internationally traded bonds. Also, when investing into 
tangible and intangible capital households require premia   and   in order to cover the 
increased risk on the return related to these assets. The real interest rate rt is equal to the 
nominal interest rate minus expected inflation: 
K
t rp
) ( 1 + t
A
t rp
− = t t t E i r π .  
The utility function is additively separable in consumption ( ) and leisure ( ). We 
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For leisure we assume CES preferences with common labour supply elasticity but a skill 
specific weight ( s ω ) on leisure. This is necessary in order to capture differences in 
employment levels across skill groups. Thus preferences for leisure are given by   
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t L L V     with  0 > κ . 
 
  6The investment decisions w.r.t. real capital and decisions w.r.t. the degree of capacity 
utilisation are subject to convex adjustment costs  J Γ  and  U Γ , which are given by 
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Consumption (C) and investment (J) is itself an aggregate of domestic and foreign varieties of 
final goods, with preferences expressed by the following CES utility function 
 
(5a) 
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with   and  {
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i d Z  and 
i f Z  are indexes of demand across the continuum of 




















































































We denote with 
C P  the corresponding utility based deflator for the C and J aggregate. The 
first order conditions of the household with respect to consumption, financial and real assets 
are given by the following equations: 
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All arbitrage conditions are standard, except for a trading friction ( (.) F B Γ ) on foreign bonds, 
which is modelled as a function of the ratio of assets to GDP. Using the arbitrage conditions 
and neglecting the second order terms, investment is given as a function of the variable    t Q
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Notice, the relevant discount factor for the investor is the nominal interest rate adjusted by the 
trading friction minus the expected inflation of investment goods ( ).  
C
t 1 + π
 
Non-liquidity constrained households buy new patents of designs produced by the R&D 
sector ( ) and rent their total stock of design ( ) at rental rate   to intermediate goods 
producers in period t. Households pay income tax at rate   on the period return of 
intangibles and they receive tax subsidies at rate τ
A.  Hence, the first order conditions with 
respect to R&D investments are given by 
A
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Therefore the rental rate can be obtained from (6b), (7c) and (7d) after neglecting the second 
order terms: 





























+ = +π . 
Equation (7c') states that household require a rate of return on intangible capital which is 
equal to the nominal interest rate minus the rate of change of the value of intangible assets 
and also covers the cost of economic depreciation plus a risk premium. Governments can 
affect investment decisions in intangible capital by giving tax incentives in the form of tax 
credits and depreciation allowances or by lowering the tax on the return from patents. 
 
 
1.1.2  Liquidity constrained households 
 
Liquidity constrained households do not optimize but simply consume their current income at 
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1.1.3 Wage  setting 
 
Within each skill group a variety of labour services are supplied which are imperfect 
substitutes to each other. Thus trade unions can charge a wage mark-up ( ) over the 
reservation wage
W
t η / 1
6. The reservation wage is given as the marginal utility of leisure divided by 
the corresponding marginal utility of consumption. The relevant net real wage to which the 
mark up adjusted reservation wage is equated is the gross wage adjusted for labour taxes, 
consumption taxes and unemployment benefits which act as a subsidy to leisure. Thus the 







































The aggregate of any household specific variable   in per capita terms is given by  
h
t X
                                                 
6 The mark-up depends on the intratemporal elasticity of substitution between different types of labour σs  and 
fluctuations in the mark-up arise because of wage adjustment costs and the fact that a fraction (1-sfw) of workers 
is indexing the growth rate of wages π
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Hence aggregate consumption and employment is given by 
 

















1.2.1  Final output producers 
 
Since each firm j ( ) produces a variety of the domestic good which is an imperfect 
substitute for the varieties produced by other firms it acts as a monopolistic competitor facing 
a demand function with a price elasticity given by  . Final output (
n j ,...., 1 =
d σ
j Y ) is produced using A 
varieties of intermediate inputs (x) with an elasticity of substitution θ. The final good sector 
uses a labour aggregate and domestic intermediate goods with Cobb-Douglas technology, 
subject to a fixed cost FCY and overhead labour FCL  
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Parameter ss is the population share of labour-force in subgroup s (low-, medium- and high-
skilled), L
s denotes the employment rate of population s, efs is the corresponding efficiency 
unit, and  L σ  is the elasticity of substitution between different labour types. Note that high-
skilled labour in the final goods sector,  , is the total high-skill employment minus the 
high-skilled labour working for the R&D sector ( ). The employment aggregates   
combine varieties of differentiated labour services supplied by individual household 
HY
t L
































The parameter  1 > s σ  determines the degree of substitutability among different types of 
labour. 
 
  10The above production function employs the idea of product variety framework proposed by 
Dixit and Stiglitz (1977) and applied in the literature of international trade and R&D 
diffusion
7 and we will explicitly model the underlying development of R&D by the semi-
endogenous framework of Jones (1995 and 2005)
8.  
 
The objective of the firm is to maximise profits 
(16)  ,  ()
j
























, , , , ∑
=
− + + − = ( )
where px is the price of intermediate inputs and   is a wage index corresponding to the 
CES aggregate  . All prices and wages are normalized with Pt, the price of domestic final 
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1.2.2  Intermediate goods producers 
 
The intermediate sector consists of monopolistically competitive firms which have entered the 
market by licensing a design from domestic households and by making an initial payment 
 to overcome administrative entry barriers. Capital inputs are also rented from the 
household sector for a rental rate of  . Firms which have acquired a design can transform 
each unit of capital into a single unit of an intermediate input. Intermediate goods producing 
firms sell their products to domestic final good producers. In symmetric equilibrium the 





Each domestic intermediate firm solves the following profit-maximisation problem 
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7 See Grossman and Helpman (1991) and Aghion and Howitt (1998). 
8 Butler and Pakko (1998) also applied Jones (1995) semi-endogenous growth framework to examine the effect 
of endogenous technological change on the properties of a real business cycle model without skill 
disaggregation. 
9 Similar to the wage mark-up, we allow for fluctuations in the mark-up of prices because of price adjustment 
costs and the fact that a fraction of firms is indexing price increases to inflation in the previous period (see 
footnote 5). 
 
  11subject to a linear technology which allows to transform one unit of effective capital (ki·ucapt) 
into one unit of an intermediate good  
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In a symmetric equilibrium the first order condition is 
 





























Intermediate goods producers set prices as a mark up over marginal cost. Therefore prices for 
the domestic market are given by: 
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The no-arbitrage condition requires that entry into the intermediate goods producing sector 
takes place until  
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or equivalently, the present discounted value of profits is equated to the fixed entry costs plus 
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For an intermediate producer, entry costs consist of the licensing fee   for the design or 
patent which is a prerequisite of production of innovative intermediate goods and a fixed 








1.2.3 R&D  sector 
 
Innovation corresponds to the discovery of a new variety of producer durables that provides 
an alternative way of producing the final good. The R&D sector hires high-skilled labour (LA) 
and generates new designs according to the following knowledge production function: 
 
(22)  . 
λ φ ϖ ν t A t t t L A A A , 1
*
1 − − = Δ
 
In this framework we allow for international R&D spillovers following Bottazzi and Peri 
(2007).  Parameters ϖ and φ  measure the foreign and domestic spillover effects from the 
aggregate international and domestic stock of knowledge (A
* and A) respectively. Negative 
value for these parameters can be interpreted as the "fishing out" effect, i.e. when innovation 
decreases with the level of knowledge, while positive values refer to the "standing on 
shoulders" effect and imply positive research spillovers. Note that   1 = φ   would give back the 
  12strong scale effect feature of fully endogenous growth models with respect to the domestic 
level of knowledge. Parameter ν  can be interpreted as total factor efficiency of R&D 
production, while λ  measures the elasticity of R&D production on the number of researchers 
( ). The international stock of knowledge grows exogenously at rate  . We assume that 
the R&D sector is operated by a research institute which employs high skilled labour at their 
market rate  . We also assume that the research institute faces an adjustment cost of hiring 
new employees and maximizes the following discounted profit-stream: 
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therefore the first order condition implies: 
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where dt is the discount factor. 
 
1.3  Trade and the current account  
 
The economies trade both final and intermediate goods. The elasticity of substitution between 
bundles of domestic and foreign goods 
i d Z  and 
i f Z  is σ . Thus aggregate imports are given 
by 
 




























And there is producer pricing of imports and exports.  
 










Thus net foreign assets evolve according to 
 











On the expenditure side we assume that government consumption, government transfers and 
government investment are proportional to GDP and unemployment benefits are indexed to 
wages as follows 
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where the benefit replacement rate  can be indexed to consumer prices and net wages in 
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The government provides subsidies ( ) on physical capital and R&D investments in the 
form of a tax-credit and depreciation allowances 
t S
 


















t t J P J P A P K P t S
, , , ,
1
,
1 1 τ τ δ δ + + + = − − −
 
Government revenues  are made up of taxes on consumption as well as capital and labour 
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where   is the government debt target.  
T b
 
Monetary policy is modelled via the following Taylor rule, which allows for some 
smoothness of the interest rate response to the inflation and output gap 
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The Central bank has a constant inflation target   and it adjusts interest rates whenever 
actual consumer price inflation deviates from the target and it also responds to the output gap. 
There is also some inertia in nominal interest rate setting. 
T π
Rather than defining the output gap as the difference between actual and efficient output, we  
use a measure that closely approximates the standard practice of output gap calculation as 
used for fiscal surveillance and monetary policy (see Denis et al. (2006)), in which a 
production function framework is used where the output gap is defined as deviation of capital 
and labour utilisation from their long run trends. Therefore we define the output gap as 
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2.1 Goods  Market 
 
We identify the final goods sector as the service sector and the intermediate sector as the 
manufacturing sector. The manufacturing sector resembles the intermediate sector along 
various dimensions. First, this sector is more R&D and patent intensive, second, a large 
fraction of manufacturing supplies innovative goods (in the form of investment goods but also 
innovative consumer goods). Services on the other hand are typically not subject to large 
(patented) innovations but are subject to organisational changes possibly in relation to new 
technologies supplied by the manufacturing sector. A good example in this respect is the ICT 
investment driven productivity increase in retail, wholesale trade and banking in some 
countries, notably the US. Also the two sectors differ in the degree of competition, with 
manufacturing showing smaller mark ups compared to services. For calculating mark ups we 
use a method suggested by Roeger (1995). We find substantially high mark ups in services in 
the EU (24%) while mark ups in manufacturing are lower (12%). Similar results but with 
even stronger differences in manufacturing industries have been obtained by Christopoulou 
and Vermeulen (2008). The results on cross country differences in the level of mark ups are 
interesting since they suggest a positive link between the level of mark ups and R&D 
investment as suggested by our model. This comes out even clearer in earlier work by 
Oliveira Martins et al. (1996) which shows that sectors with high R&D intensities tend to 
have higher mark ups.  
 
It is a stylised fact that product markets are more regulated in the EU compared to the US. 
Recent evidence can be found in Hoj et al. (2007). To our knowledge estimates on entry 
barriers for specific sectors do not exist. Therefore we rely on the aggregate estimates 
provided by Djankov et al. (2002). These estimates are particularly useful since they provide 
directly quantifiable evidence on costs of procedures and time that a start-up must bear before 
the firm can operate legally. This information can be directly used for the calibration of the 
entry cost parameter in the model. The average entry cost per firm is estimated to be around 
66 percent of GDP per capita in the whole sample. Their calculations show that the European 
countries impose 2 to 60 times higher entry costs than the US. Based on the Djankov et al. 
(2002) methodology Kox (2005) re-estimated the start-up costs for the EU. He estimates the 
EU average entry cost of setting up a standard firm at 57.3 percent of per capita GDP and 
only to 1.6% for the US. Cross country variation is large and ranges from 4.5 percent of per 
capita GDP for the UK to 1.83 times per capita GDP in Hungary.  
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2.2 R&D  sector 
 
Empirical evidence on output elasticities of R&D production has recently been provided by 
Bottazzi and Peri. (2007)
  10. Concerning the subsidies to R&D investments, empirical 
evidence provided by Warda (1996, 2006) indicates an average of 5 percentage point net 





2.3 Labour  market 
 
We use information from our estimation of the core QUEST III model (see Ratto et al. 
(2008)) to calibrate the parameters of the utility function, labour supply elasticity and the 
frictional parameters. Labour force is disaggregated into three skill-groups: low-, medium- 
and high-skilled labour
12. Data on skill-specific population shares, participation rates and 
wage-premia are obtained from OECD (2006), the Labour Force Survey and Science and 
Technology databases of EUROSTAT. The elasticity of substitution between different labour 
types (σ) is one of the major issue addressed in the labour-economics literature. We follow 
Caselli and Coleman (2006) which analysed the cross-country differences of the aggregate 
production function when skilled and unskilled labour are imperfect substitutes. The authors 
argue in favour of using the Katz and Murphy (1992) estimate of 1.4. We set the efficiency of 
low-skilled at 1 for EU27, the other efficiency units are restricted by the labour demand 




































































Note that these efficiencies are proportional to the relative population shares. In order to get 
comparable efficiency units we must normalize with the population share using the following 
correction: 
() {} H M L s l s ef ef L s s s s , , , 1
1
* ∈ = −σ . 
 
The calibration of the model is summarized in Table 2.1 and a simplified flow-chart of the 
model is presented in Figure A of the Appendix. 
 
                                                 
10 See Appendix A for a more detailed discussion of calibrating the R&D production parameters. 
11 See Appendix B for more details on the B-index and how it relates to tax parameters in the model. 
12 We define high skilled workers as that segment of labour force that can potentially be employed in the R&D 
sector, i.e. engineers and natural scientists. Our definition of low-skilled corresponds to the standard 
classification of ISCED 0-2 education levels and the rest of the labour force is considered as medium-skilled. 
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Table 2.1  Calibration 




LA 0.010  EUROSTAT/OECD 
R&D intensity (%)  1.840  EUROSTAT/OECD 
λ  0.729  calibration (constrained by equations) 
φ  0.531 Bottazzi-Peri  (2007) 
ϖ  0.447 Bottazzi-Peri  (2007) 




markup 0.12  own  estimates 
fixed entry costs  0.38  Djankov et. al. (2002) 
 
Final goods sector 
  
Final good mark up  0.242  own estimates 




Skill distribution:     
sL  0.350 EUROSTAT/OECD 
sM 0.588  EUROSTAT/OECD 
sH  0.062 EUROSTAT/OECD 
Employment rates:     
LL  0.572 EUROSTAT/OECD 
LM 0.744  EUROSTAT/OECD 
LH 0.837  EUROSTAT/OECD 
σL (elasticity of. substitution)  1.400  Katz and Murphy (2002) 
L 0.689  EUROSTAT/OECD 
Skill premium %  (high vs. medium)  50.11  EUROSTAT/OECD 
Skill premium %  (medium vs. low)  23.66  EUROSTAT/OECD 
Efficiency levels:     
ef
*
L  1.000  calibration (constrained by equations) 
ef
*
M  2.103  calibration (constrained by equations) 
ef
*
H  8.175  calibration (constrained by equations) 
Labour adjustment cost (% of total wage costs)  18  own estimates 
Labour supply elasticity (1/κ ) 1/4  own  estimates 
Benefit replacement rate  0.400  own estimates 
 
Taxes and subsidies  
  
Net R&D Subsidies   0.050  OECD/Warda (2006)  
Depreciation of intangible capital  0  calibration 
Corporate taxes  0.448  OECD/Warda (2006) 
VAT 0.170  own  estimates 
Labour taxes (incl. social security)  0.386  own estimates 
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3.  Scenarios of reforms 
 
 
This section describes some illustrative scenarios of structural reforms with the model. The 
standard simulations we consider include R&D promoting policies, product market reforms 
that affect capital costs, fixed costs, entry barriers and mark-ups, labour market reforms like 
tax shifts and changes to benefit generosity and changes in skill composition. More 
specifically the reform scenarios we simulate are: 
 
•  Raising R&D through subsidies: tax-credits and wage subsidies (3.1) 
•  Reducing product market mark-ups (3.2) 
•  Reducing capital costs  (3.3) 
•  Reduction in fixed costs  (3.4 ) 
•  Exogenous productivity shock (3.5) 
•  Reducing wage mark-ups (3.6) 
•  Tax shifts: from labour to consumption and from low- to high skilled (3.7 and 3.8) 
•  Reducing benefit generosity (3.9) 





3.1  Raising R&D through tax credits and wage subsidies  
 
The specification of knowledge production in the model presented in this paper is consistent 
with the often heard argument that market economies underinvest in R&D because individual 
investors do not fully internalise the external effects from knowledge spillovers. Empirical 
studies seem to confirm this claim. Estimates of private rates of return
13 vary between 8 and 
20% (see Coe and Helpman (1995) and Botazzi and Perri (2007)). Estimates of social rates of 
return based on interfirm technology spillovers vary between 17% (Sveikauskas (1981)) and 
100% (Jones and Williams (1998)). The studies by Coe and Helpman as well as Botazzi and 
Perri also show that there are considerable cross country spillovers. The existence of positive 
externalities associated with R&D suggests that policies boosting knowledge investment yield 
social benefits. This section therefore considers two alternative policies. The first scenario is 
an R&D subsidy in the form of a tax credit (τ
A) of 0.1 percent of GDP to the non-liquidity 
constrained households on their income from intangible capital. Table 3.1.a presents the 
effects on production, R&D intensity, TFP, R&D labour, total employment and other 
variables
14. Subsidies are financed in a budgetary neutral manner through an increase in 
lump-sum taxes to households. The simulations show the important characteristic of semi-
endogenous growth models: permanent subsidies for R&D-using sectors give a permanent 
increase in GDP level in the long-run while GDP growth stabilizes. Higher tax-credits allow 
households to lower the rental rate for intangibles, thus reducing the fixed costs of firms 
producing intermediates. This in turn raises the demand for blueprints and stimulates R&D 
and reallocates high skilled workers from production into the research sector. The size of the 
                                                 
h
13 The return on R&D is usually defined as the marginal product of the R&D stock. This can be translated into a 
growth effect on TFP by multiplying the social return with the share of R&D in output.  
14 Note that in t e tables TFP refers to a constructed measure of technological progress defined as 
( )
α α − 1 / K L Y Y  
  18effect is however rather limited. The results show a 0.08 percent increase in GDP relative to 
the baseline 20 years after the initial shock and 0.31 percent in the long run. In the long-run 
the number of employees in the R&D sector increases by around 4 percent and R&D intensity 
rises by 0.08 percentage points. Notice that it takes time for the output effects to emerge 
because of short run output losses due to the reallocation of high skilled workers from 
production to research. Because of supply constraints for high skilled workers part of the 
fiscal stimulus is offset by wage increases for high skilled workers 
 
Concerning tangible capital stock we have to distinguish between two opposing effects. In the 
short run, the strong decline of high-skilled labour input in the final goods sector lowers the 
marginal product of capital which reduces the demand for physical capital.  On the other hand 
higher tax-credits allow non-liquidity constrained households to charge less for intangibles 
thus reducing the costs of intermediate firms. In the long-run this latter effect unambiguously 
dominates as technical progress accelerates due to the higher entry rates of intermediate firms.  
 
Table 3.1.b shows a scenario in which the subsidy takes the form of a subsidy on the wages of 
researchers given to the R&D sector. The results show somewhat stronger GDP effects: a 0.1 
percent increase in GDP relative to the baseline 20 years after the initial shock and 0.44 
percent in the long run. Compared to the R&D subsidy given in the form of tax-credits, this 
scenario gives more stimulus to the employment of researchers in the long-run: the number of 
researchers increases by 5.7 percent and R&D intensity rises by 0.12 percentage point.  
 
According to these model simulations wage subsidies in the R&D sector are more efficient 
than subsidising the use of R&D. It can be shown that the presence of a positive mark-up in 
the intermediate goods sector lowers the efficiency of the tax credit, while R&D production is 
assumed to be perfectly competitive. It needs to be further analysed whether this result is 
robust to imperfections in R&D production. As noted in the literature (see Goolsbee (1998) 
and Wolff et al. (2008)), there are significant crowding out effects of tax subsidies in the form 
of higher wages for high skilled workers. This is feature is also present in our simulation 
experiments. About 25% of the total increase in R&D spending is due to higher wages in 
these simulations. Goolsbee's estimates for the US range from 30 to 50%. 
 
 
  19Table  3.1.a  0.1% of GDP tax-credit R&D subsidy to the non-liquidity constrained 
households 
Years  EU 
1 2 3 4 5  10  20  50  100 
GDP -0.01  -0.04  -0.05 -0.06 -0.05 0.00 0.08  0.23  0.31
TFP 0.00  -0.02  -0.02 -0.01 0.00 0.05 0.13  0.24  0.27
"Ideas/Patents"  0.06 0.22 0.44 0.67 0.90 1.97 3.50 5.46 6.04
Capital  0.00 0.00  -0.01 -0.01 -0.02 -0.04 -0.03 0.09 0.21
Capital  intensity  0.01 0.02 0.05 0.07 0.10 0.22 0.38 0.59 0.66
Employment  0.03 0.04 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.02 0.01 0.00 0.00
-low  0.02 0.04 0.05 0.06 0.07 0.08 0.07 0.05 0.04
-medium 0.01  0.01  0.01 0.01 0.01 0.00 -0.01  -0.01  -0.02
-high  -0.37 -0.89 -1.21 -1.37 -1.43 -1.38 -1.20 -0.98 -0.92
-R&D  2.59 4.85 5.78 6.14 6.26 5.95 5.17 4.20 3.91
Consumption  0.02 0.01 0.00 -0.01 -0.01 0.01 0.07 0.20 0.25
Investment -0.01  -0.03  -0.04 -0.05 -0.05 -0.05 -0.01  0.12  0.21
Real  wages  0.04 0.09 0.10 0.11 0.11 0.14 0.21 0.33 0.40
-low -0.02  -0.03  -0.04 -0.05 -0.05 -0.01 0.07  0.22  0.29
-medium -0.01  -0.01  -0.01 -0.01 0.00 0.04 0.12  0.26  0.33
-high  0.37 0.81 1.00 1.07 1.08 1.04 0.98 0.96 0.98
Exports -0.02  -0.06  -0.06 -0.06 -0.05 0.00 0.07  0.20  0.26
Imports  0.02 0.04 0.03 0.02 0.01 -0.01 0.01 0.06 0.08
Terms of trade, final goods   0.01  0.04  0.04 0.04 0.03 0.00 -0.05  -0.13  -0.17
           
Nominal interest rate  0.03  0.05  0.06 0.05 0.04 0.02 -0.01  0.00  0.00
Real  interest  rate  -0.04  -0.01 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.00
Inflation  0.05 0.07 0.06 0.05 0.04 0.01 -0.01  -0.01 0.00
Consumer price inflation  0.04  0.06  0.06 0.05 0.04 0.01 -0.01  -0.01  0.00
Lump sum taxes (% of GDP)  0.01 0.04 0.06 0.08 0.09 0.14 0.15 0.14 0.14
Unemployment  rate  -0.02 -0.03 -0.03 -0.03 -0.03 -0.03 -0.02 -0.01  0.00
-low-skilled  -0.02 -0.04 -0.05 -0.06 -0.06 -0.07 -0.06 -0.04 -0.04
-medium-skilled   -0.01  -0.01  -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 0.00 0.01  0.01  0.01
-high-skilled  -0.19 -0.21 -0.14 -0.09 -0.06 -0.04 -0.03 -0.02 -0.02
Gov. balance (% of GDP) -0.11  -0.11  -0.09 -0.08 -0.06 -0.01 0.02  0.00  0.00
Current account (% of GDP)  -0.01 -0.02 -0.04 -0.06 -0.08 -0.11 -0.09 -0.03  0.00
R&D intensity (% of GDP)  0.10 0.12 0.13 0.14 0.14 0.13 0.11 0.09 0.08
Note: percentage (points) difference from baseline 
  20Table 3.1.b  0.1% of GDP wage subsidy to the R&D sector 
Years  EU 
1 2 3 4 5  10  20  50  100 
GDP -0.02  -0.06 -0.08 -0.08 -0.08 -0.01 0.11  0.33 0.44
TFP -0.01  -0.03 -0.03 -0.02 -0.01 0.07 0.19  0.34 0.39
"Ideas/Patents"  0.08 0.31 0.62 0.95 1.28 2.82 5.06 7.95 8.83
Capital  0.00 0.00 -0.01 -0.02 -0.02 -0.05 -0.04 0.13 0.29
Capital  intensity  0.01 0.03 0.07 0.10 0.14 0.31 0.55 0.86 0.95
Employment  0.04 0.05 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.03 0.01 0.00 -0.01
-low  0.02 0.04 0.05 0.06 0.07 0.06 0.04 0.01 0.01
-medium 0.01  0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.01 0.00  -0.01 -0.02
-high  -0.53 -1.27 -1.73 -1.96 -2.05 -1.99 -1.74 -1.43 -1.33
-R&D  3.62 6.85 8.24 8.81 9.01 8.60 7.50 6.11 5.70
Consumption 0.00  -0.01 -0.02 -0.03 -0.02 0.01 0.10  0.28 0.36
Investment -0.01  -0.03 -0.05 -0.06 -0.07 -0.07 -0.02  0.17 0.30
Real  wages  0.06 0.12 0.15 0.16 0.17 0.21 0.30 0.48 0.58
-low -0.02  -0.04 -0.04 -0.05 -0.04 0.02 0.13  0.35 0.45
-medium -0.01  -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 -0.01 0.05 0.16  0.37 0.47
-high  0.51 1.14 1.43 1.53 1.55 1.50 1.42 1.39 1.43
Exports -0.02  -0.07 -0.09 -0.08 -0.07 -0.01 0.10  0.28 0.37
Imports  0.02 0.03 0.03 0.02 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.08 0.11
Terms of trade, final goods  0.02  0.05 0.06 0.06 0.05 0.00 -0.07  -0.19 -0.25
           
Nominal interest rate  0.05  0.08 0.08 0.08 0.07 0.03 -0.01  0.00 0.00
Real interest rate  -0.05  -0.01 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01  0.00 0.00
Inflation 0.07  0.10 0.09 0.07 0.06 0.01 -0.02  -0.01 0.00
Consumer price inflation  0.06  0.08 0.08 0.08 0.06 0.02 -0.02  -0.01 0.00
Lump sum taxes (% of GDP)  0.01 0.01 0.02 0.04 0.05 0.08 0.09 0.09 0.09
Unemployment rate  -0.03  -0.04 -0.04 -0.04 -0.04 -0.03 -0.01  0.00 0.00
-low-skilled  -0.02 -0.03 -0.05 -0.05 -0.06 -0.06 -0.03 -0.01 -0.01
-medium-skilled   -0.01  -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 -0.01 0.00  0.01 0.02
-high-skilled  -0.26 -0.30 -0.20 -0.13 -0.09 -0.07 -0.05 -0.04 -0.03
Gov. balance (% of GDP) -0.08  -0.08 -0.08 -0.07 -0.06 -0.01 0.02  0.00 0.00
Current account (% of GDP)  0.00 -0.02 -0.05 -0.07 -0.08 -0.13 -0.12 -0.04 -0.01
R&D intensity (% of GDP)  0.08 0.15 0.18 0.19 0.20 0.19 0.16 0.13 0.12
Note: percentage (points) difference from baseline 
  213.2  Reducing goods market mark-ups 
 
Product market reforms that enhance competition in goods markets can be simulated as 
shocks that reduce the mark-up of prices over marginal costs. In a standard DSGE model 
there is no ambiguity between the degree of competition as measured by the mark-up and the 
level of economic activity. A reduction in the mark-up increases the demand for labour and 
employment unambiguously. In a comparable exercise Bayoumi et al. (2004) used a standard 
DSGE model without endogenous technical progress to calculate the effect of a 12 percentage 
point reduction of the mark-up in Europe. The estimated positive effect on GDP and 
employment was 7% and 3% respectively. In an endogenous growth model however the link 
between mark-ups and GDP and employment is more complicated, because a mark-up is 
necessary to cover the sunk costs associated with paying for a patent when entering the 
market for intermediate goods. Thus there are two opposing effects. The resulting fall in 
intermediate goods prices increases demand for intermediates of incumbents, but the lower 
price also reduces entry of new firms and therefore the rate of technical progress. This second 
effect does not arise in the final goods sector, which operates like a conventional sector. 
Therefore we expect a positive impact from a reduction in mark-ups in the final goods sector 
and an ambiguous effect in the intermediate goods sector.  This is indeed what we can see 
from tables 3.2.a and 3.2.b.  
 
Final goods sector: 
A one percentage point reduction of the price mark-up in the final goods sector increases 
GDP by 0.91% in the long run and employment by 0.07%. While the employment effect is 
similar to the effect reported by Bayoumi et al., the GDP effect is substantially larger
15.  This 
is due to the endogenous growth effects generated by an increased demand for capital, which 
stimulates entry of new firms and increases R&D.  The increase in the capital stock exceeds 
the increase in GDP in the medium and long run because the direct effect of a reduction in the 
mark-up on investment is larger than the negative effect arising from the loss in the terms of 
trade. However, consumption rises less than GDP because of this negative terms of trade 
effect. 
 
The increased demand for labour affects employment and real wages differently because of 
differences in the labour supply response. Because of the lower employment level of low-
skilled workers, the supply of low-skilled labour is more elastic. This implies a higher 
increase in low-skilled labour compared to medium- and high-skilled labour and an increase 
in the skill premium. Notice also, the skill premium of high skilled workers increases over 
proportionally because there is an additional demand effect for high skilled workers in the 
R&D sector.  
 
Intermediate goods sector: 
Reducing the mark-up in the intermediate goods sector has no significant output effect. There 
are two opposing effects, namely an increase in the capital stock but also a reduction in 
efficiency. A reduction of mark-ups requires an increase in the scale of output of incumbents 
which translates into an increase of fixed capital but because it deters entry technical progress 
slows down. With our parameterisation (especially our level of intermediate mark-up) the two 
effects practically cancel each other out. It can be shown that this model can also generate an 
inverted U-shape relationship (see Aghion et al. ,2005) between mark-ups and income per 
capita.  
                                                 
15 Notice, the output of the final goods sector is close to GDP. 
  22Table 3.2.a  A 1 pp level reduction of the final goods market mark-up 
Years after the shock  EU 
1 2 3 4 5  10  20  50  100 
GDP  0.13 0.32 0.36 0.36 0.37 0.46 0.63 0.85 0.91 
TFP  0.07 0.19 0.20 0.20 0.19 0.18 0.16 0.15 0.15 
"Ideas/Patents"  0.01 0.05 0.08 0.11 0.13 0.20 0.29 0.39 0.43 
Capital  0.02 0.09 0.17 0.26 0.35 0.69 1.16 1.72 1.88 
Capital  intensity  0.00 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.03 0.04 0.05 
Employment  0.08 0.18 0.16 0.11 0.08 0.04 0.06 0.07 0.07 
-low 0.06  0.13 0.09 0.01 -0.06 -0.18  -0.17  -0.14 -0.13 
-medium  0.08 0.19 0.19 0.15 0.13 0.12 0.14 0.14 0.14 
-high  -0.01 0.01 -0.04 -0.07 -0.07 -0.01 0.01 0.02 0.02 
-R&D  0.63 0.95 0.85 0.69 0.58 0.40 0.33 0.30 0.28 
Consumption -0.09  -0.04 0.01 0.04 0.05 0.11  0.17  0.25 0.28 
Investment  0.29 0.59 0.73 0.81 0.87 1.08 1.39 1.77 1.89 
Real  wages  0.53 1.05 1.31 1.43 1.50 1.62 1.78 1.97 2.03 
-low  0.52 1.03 1.32 1.50 1.60 1.78 1.93 2.11 2.17 
-medium  0.52 1.01 1.27 1.39 1.44 1.55 1.71 1.91 1.97 
-high  0.63 1.24 1.49 1.56 1.58 1.65 1.80 2.00 2.05 
Exports  0.07 0.26 0.26 0.25 0.24 0.33 0.51 0.71 0.76 
Imports -0.14  -0.12 -0.01 0.06 0.10 0.15  0.17  0.22 0.24 
Terms of trade, final goods  -0.05  -0.18 -0.17 -0.16 -0.16 -0.22  -0.34  -0.47 -0.51 
           
Nominal interest rate  -0.33  -0.37 -0.29 -0.23 -0.18 -0.09  -0.01  0.04 0.01 
Real interest rate  0.25  -0.04 -0.05 -0.03 -0.01 0.01  0.01  0.00 0.00 
Inflation  -0.48 -0.46 -0.29 -0.22 -0.19 -0.11 -0.02  0.04 0.01 
Consumer price inflation  -0.41  -0.42 -0.31 -0.24 -0.19 -0.10  -0.02  0.04 0.01 
Lump sum taxes (% of GDP)  0.01 -0.04 -0.12 -0.19 -0.25 -0.35 -0.35 -0.29 -0.26 
Unemployment  rate  -0.07 -0.16 -0.14 -0.10 -0.06 -0.03 -0.04 -0.05 -0.05 
-low-skilled -0.05  -0.12 -0.08 -0.01 0.05 0.16  0.15  0.12 0.12 
-medium-skilled    -0.08 -0.18 -0.18 -0.14 -0.12 -0.11 -0.13 -0.13 -0.13 
-high-skilled  -0.11 -0.18 -0.13 -0.07 -0.05 -0.06 -0.07 -0.07 -0.07 
Gov. balance (% of GDP) 0.25  0.47 0.41 0.31 0.23 0.05  -0.03  -0.04 -0.01 
Current account (% of GDP)  0.03 0.11 0.16 0.18 0.18 0.12 0.01  -0.02 0.00 
R&D intensity (% of GDP)  0.04 0.04 0.04 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03 
Note: percentage (points) difference from baseline 
  23Table 3.2.b  A 1 pp level reduction of the intermediate goods market mark-up 
Years after the shock  EU 
1 2 3 4 5  10  20  50  100 
GDP  0.07 0.23 0.29 0.32 0.33 0.34 0.32 0.20 0.10
TFP  0.10  0.18 0.19 0.17 0.15 0.04 -0.13 -0.35 -0.41
"Ideas/Patents"  -0.11 -0.44 -0.87 -1.34 -1.80 -3.89 -6.85  -10.53 -11.62
Capital  0.02 0.07 0.14 0.21 0.28 0.58 0.96 1.22 1.14
Capital  intensity  -0.01 -0.04 -0.09 -0.13 -0.18 -0.40 -0.71 -1.11 -1.23
Employment  -0.13 -0.11 -0.09 -0.08 -0.07 -0.05 -0.01  0.02 0.02
-low  -0.10 -0.10 -0.10 -0.10 -0.10 -0.07 -0.02  0.02 0.02
-medium  -0.10  -0.07 -0.06 -0.05 -0.05 -0.03 0.00 0.02 0.02
-high  0.63 1.69 2.36 2.67 2.79 2.68 2.36 1.95 1.82
-R&D  -5.12 -9.57 -11.38 -12.07 -12.27 -11.65  -10.19 -8.33 -7.78
Consumption  -0.03 -0.01 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.00 -0.06 -0.21 -0.29
Investment  0.22 0.45 0.58 0.67 0.73 0.92 1.13 1.22 1.13
Real  wages  0.01 -0.04 -0.05 -0.03 -0.02 0.01  0.02 -0.06 -0.14
-low  0.13 0.18 0.22 0.24 0.25 0.25 0.22 0.10 0.01
-medium  0.10 0.14 0.18 0.20 0.21 0.23 0.21 0.10 0.01
-high  -0.62 -1.42 -1.77 -1.85 -1.84 -1.67 -1.45 -1.25 -1.25
Exports  0.01 0.17 0.22 0.24 0.24 0.25 0.25 0.17 0.09
Imports  -0.03  -0.03 0.00 0.02 0.04 0.08 0.10 0.06 0.03
Terms of trade, final goods  0.00  -0.12 -0.15 -0.16 -0.16 -0.17  -0.16  -0.11 -0.06
           
Nominal interest rate  -0.24  -0.30 -0.29 -0.27 -0.24 -0.12  0.00  0.04 0.00
Real  interest  rate  0.17 0.03 0.01 0.00 0.00 -0.01  -0.01 0.00 0.00
Inflation  -0.32  -0.36 -0.32 -0.29 -0.25 -0.13 0.00 0.04 0.01
Consumer price inflation  -0.29  -0.33 -0.31 -0.28 -0.25 -0.13  0.00  0.04 0.01
Lump sum taxes (% of GDP)  0.03 0.06 0.07 0.07 0.07 0.07 0.07 0.07 0.07
Unemployment  rate  0.11 0.10 0.08 0.07 0.07 0.04 0.01  -0.02 -0.02
-low-skilled  0.09 0.09 0.09 0.09 0.09 0.06 0.02  -0.02 -0.02
-medium-skilled    0.09 0.07 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.03 0.00  -0.02 -0.02
-high-skilled  0.47 0.47 0.30 0.18 0.13 0.10 0.07 0.05 0.04
Gov. balance (% of GDP)  0.03 0.15 0.17 0.16 0.15 0.08 0.00  -0.03 0.00
Current account (% of GDP)  0.00 0.03 0.06 0.08 0.10 0.15 0.15 0.05 0.01
R&D intensity (% of GDP)  -0.18 -0.23 -0.26 -0.26 -0.26 -0.25 -0.22 -0.18 -0.17
Note: percentage (points) difference from baseline 
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Here we simulate an exogenous reduction of capital costs of 0.5 percentage points. We think 
of this reduction as being induced by lowering the equity premium ( or  ) or, 
equivalently, the intermediation premium required by the banking sector for loans on physical 






Final goods sector: 
 
By improving possibilities for risk sharing and increasing banking competition financial 
market integration is likely to reduce the costs of lending. Even though the introduction of the 
euro and various reform efforts associated with the Financial Services Action Plan have 
already lowered capital costs in Europe, the market is still not fully integrated. A recent study 
(London Economics 2002) suggested - on the basis of a survey among financial market 
participants - that financial market integration in the EU could reduce capital costs by about 
50 basispoints (equity: 60bp, bonds: 40bp, loans: 20bp). More recent studies also point in this 
direction. In the case of equity risk premia, Hardouvelis et al. (2004) show that since the 
beginning of the 1990s, the cost of equity capital (risk premium) fell on average by about 1.5 
percentage points. However, even though equity premia have converged strongly, especially 
at the end of the 1990s, there still remains a gap between the average equity premium in the 
EU in specific sectors and the country with the lowest premium in the order of magnitude of 
more than 100bp. Also Baele et al. (2004) notes that there is still room for further financial 
market integration effects as risk premia do not seem to have converged further since 2001. 
Concerning loans, integration related reductions of capital costs have been small since 2002. 
Baele et al. (2004) for example argues that integration in Euro area banking markets may be 
considered quite advanced from a legal perspective, but nevertheless price differentials 
remain relatively high. This is also shown by a recent ECB paper on loan deposit margins. 
The reported statistics on new loans (over the period 2003-05) - which should reflect the most 
recent state of competition in the market for loans - suggests that reducing loan deposit 
margins in EU countries to best practice levels could lead to a reduction of lending rates by 
about 50 to 60bp. In the bond market, integration seems to be very advanced. Recent studies 
(Baele et al. (2004)) estimate the dispersion of country risk factors to only about 10 to 15bp. 
Since the share of bond financing is below 10%, the evidence on the current state of financial 
market integration suggests that completing the single market for financial services could lead 
to a further reduction of capital costs by about 50 basispoints.  
 
A reduction in capital costs unambiguously increases the demand for capital (Table 3.3.a). A 
50bp reduction in capital costs increases GDP by about 0.6 percent after 10 years. The 
additional growth effect mostly comes from physical capital which is 1.7 percent higher after 
10 years. Compared to a reduction in the mark-up of the final goods sector the employment 
effect is smaller because there is no direct shift of demand in favour of labour. The GDP 
effect exceeds the effect one would expect from a standard growth model, since the higher 
demand for capital stimulates market entry and thereby innovation. 
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Years  EU 
1 2 3 4 5  10  20  50  100 
GDP  0.05 0.09 0.15 0.21 0.28 0.57 0.98 1.47 1.59 
TFP  0.01 -0.01 -0.02 -0.04 -0.05 -0.11 -0.18 -0.24 -0.25 
"Ideas/Patents"  0.00 0.01 0.02 0.03 0.04 0.09 0.17 0.27 0.29 
Capital  0.05 0.21 0.40 0.61 0.81 1.69 2.93 4.45 4.83 
Capital  intensity  0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.02 0.03 0.03 
Employment  0.03 0.03 0.04 0.04 0.05 0.07 0.09 0.08 0.05 
-low  0.01 0.00 -0.01 0.00 0.00 0.04 0.08 0.06 0.02 
-medium  0.03 0.04 0.05 0.06 0.06 0.08 0.10 0.09 0.06 
-high 0.02  -0.01 -0.02 -0.02 -0.02  -0.01  0.00  0.01 0.00 
-R&D  0.13 0.22 0.25 0.26 0.27 0.28 0.26 0.21 0.18 
Consumption  -0.33 -0.54 -0.58 -0.58 -0.57 -0.47 -0.31 -0.10 -0.05 
Investment  0.70 1.35 1.69 1.91 2.07 2.70 3.56 4.59 4.84 
Real  wages  0.00 0.04 0.09 0.15 0.20 0.47 0.85 1.32 1.43 
-low  0.02 0.07 0.13 0.18 0.23 0.48 0.85 1.33 1.45 
-medium  -0.01 0.03 0.08 0.13 0.19 0.45 0.84 1.31 1.42 
-high  0.02 0.08 0.13 0.19 0.25 0.52 0.90 1.36 1.47 
Exports  0.04 0.01 0.03 0.08 0.14 0.41 0.80 1.24 1.34 
Imports -0.05  -0.02 0.02 0.04 0.06  0.13  0.25  0.38 0.42 
Terms of trade, final goods  -0.03  -0.01 -0.02 -0.06 -0.09  -0.28  -0.53  -0.82 -0.88 
           
Nominal interest rate  0.10  0.16 0.20 0.23 0.25  0.33  0.38  0.24 0.05 
Real  interest  rate  -0.04 0.01 0.03 0.04 0.04 0.03 0.02 0.00 0.00 
Inflation  0.10 0.14 0.16 0.18 0.20 0.29 0.36 0.24 0.05 
Consumer price inflation  0.11  0.14 0.16 0.19 0.21 0.30 0.37 0.24 0.05 
Lump sum taxes (% of GDP)  0.00 0.01 0.03 0.05 0.07 0.13 0.19 0.26 0.30 
Unemployment  rate  -0.03 -0.03 -0.03 -0.03 -0.04 -0.06 -0.08 -0.07 -0.04 
-low-skilled -0.01  0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00  -0.04  -0.07  -0.05 -0.02 
-medium-skilled    -0.03 -0.04 -0.05 -0.05 -0.06 -0.07 -0.09 -0.08 -0.06 
-high-skilled  -0.04 -0.03 -0.03 -0.03 -0.03 -0.04 -0.05 -0.04 -0.03 
Gov. balance (% of GDP)  -0.07 -0.14 -0.17 -0.18 -0.18 -0.21 -0.24 -0.15 -0.03 
Current account (% of GDP) 0.01  0.03 0.03 0.03 0.02  -0.01  -0.02  -0.02 0.00 
R&D intensity (% of GDP)  0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 




Intermediate goods sector: 
 
Transforming new ideas into marketable products and services is probably one of the most 
central mechanisms generating growth in modern industrial economies. Innovations can be 
made within existing companies but they can (and often are) made by newcomers. These can 
be researchers in universities or firms who intent to market their ideas by creating their own 
businesses. Investing in ideas is more risky compared to physical capital investment because 
in the case of failure of the project the initial investment (patent) may have to be written-off 
  26completely, while physical investment goods still have a sizeable resale value in case of 
bankruptcy. Because intangibles do not constitute collateral to the same extent as tangible 
capital, financing constraints are likely to be more acute. And although both existing firms 
and start-up companies face similar problems when marketing new products, in the case of 
start-ups these problems are likely to be more severe.  Start-ups do not have access to public 
capital markets and in the absence of a track record they may have more difficulties to obtain 
bank finance. New firms also have to overcome administrative hurdles when setting up a new 
company (although existing companies may face administrative costs when introducing new 
products as well). 
 
A particular form of financing innovations, namely venture capital, was born in the US after 
WW II when professors from Harvard and MIT created American Research and Development 
(ARD) in order to raise funds from wealthy individuals and college endowments in order to 
invest them in high-tech entrepreneurial start-ups (see Bottazzi et al. 2002). Venture capital 
has become a popular form of financing young firms in high-tech sectors. Since the beginning 
of the 1990s venture capital financing has also become popular in the EU. It now amounts to 
0.12% of GDP compared to 0.19% in the US
16. There are numerous studies both at the micro 
and the macro level suggesting a positive relationship between the availability of venture 
capital and economic performance. At the micro level a recent ZEW study (Gottschalk et al. 
2007) shows that firms with VC finance have grown faster compared to a control group 
without access to VC. Similar results have been obtained for the US by Hellmann and Puri 
(2002). At the macro level Romain and van Pottelsbergh (2004) establish a positive 
relationship between VC and productivity growth.    
 
As pointed out in a study by Aghion et al. (2007), financial constraints related to entry could 
be as important as labour market rigidities in terms of obstacles to growth. When it comes to 
innovation, there are numerous examples which indicate that a larger share of innovations is 
undertaken by young firms in the US compared to the EU. Venture capitalists provide loans to 
start-ups and they require a return to compensate for the opportunity cost of not investing in 
alternative assets as well as for the risk associated with such an investment. With 
underdeveloped venture capital markets investors lack opportunities to diversify risk and 
therefore they require a larger risk premium
17. Philipon and Veron (2008) suggest a number 
of measures to increase the supply of venture capital financing. Among others they argue for 
more competition in the banking sector, changes in insolvency legislation and removal of 
prudential regulations, which hamper equity investment by institutional investors such as 
pension funds and insurance companies. 
 
Table 3.3.b shows how a reduction in financing costs for start-ups of 50 basispoints could 
stimulate growth in the EU. Improving access to credit for start-ups makes projects which 
generate a lower present discounted value of profits profitable and thereby stimulates entry 
and the introduction of new products. In the long run the level of output could increase by 
about 0.3% and investment would be directed more towards R&D with this more targeted 
measure
18. To put these effects into perspective, financing costs in the EU are about five 
                                                 
16 These figures are calculated as an average over the period 2004-2006 (source: Meyer (2008)). Notice however, 
some countries in the EU, notably those with a high-tech specialisation such as the UK, Sweden and Denmark 
have a share of venture capital investment that exceeds that of the US. However high tech states in the US such 
as California have VC investment shares far larger than EU regions. 
17 Alternatively the risk premium can also be interpreted as the shadow price of the collateral constraint for the 
firm investing in intangible capital. 
18 Also in this case, the labour supply elasticity of high skilled workers is a crucial determinant of the total effect. 
  27times larger than those in the US. Reducing the financing costs to US levels could result in a 
long run increase of GDP of about 1.5% and an increase in the R&D expenditure share of 
about 0.5% points. This suggests that financing constraints for start-up companies could be an 
important factor preventing an increase in the R&D share. 
 
 
Table 3.3.b  Reduction of intangible capital costs of 50bp 
Years  EU 
1 2 3 4 5  10  20  50  100 
GDP -0.01  -0.05 -0.06 -0.06 -0.06 -0.01 0.08  0.25 0.33
TFP 0.00  -0.02 -0.02 -0.01 0.00 0.05 0.14  0.26 0.29
"Ideas/Patents"  0.06 0.24 0.47 0.71 0.96 2.11 3.78 5.96 6.65
Capital  0.00 0.00 -0.01 -0.01 -0.02 -0.03 -0.03 0.10 0.22
Capital  intensity  0.01 0.03 0.05 0.08 0.11 0.23 0.41 0.65 0.72
Employment 0.03  0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.02 0.00  -0.01 -0.01
-low 0.01  0.02 0.03 0.03 0.04 0.03 0.01  -0.01 -0.01
-medium 0.01  0.01 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.01 0.00  -0.01 -0.01
-high  -0.40 -0.95 -1.30 -1.47 -1.53 -1.48 -1.30 -1.08 -1.01
-R&D  2.77 5.19 6.19 6.59 6.72 6.41 5.63 4.62 4.32
Consumption 0.00  -0.01 -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 0.01 0.08  0.21 0.27
Investment -0.01  -0.02 -0.04 -0.04 -0.05 -0.05 -0.01  0.12 0.23
Real  wages  0.04 0.09 0.11 0.12 0.13 0.16 0.23 0.37 0.44
-low -0.01  -0.02 -0.03 -0.03 -0.02 0.03 0.11  0.27 0.35
-medium -0.01  -0.01 -0.02 -0.01 -0.01 0.04 0.12  0.28 0.36
-high  0.39 0.86 1.07 1.14 1.15 1.12 1.06 1.05 1.08
Exports -0.01  -0.05 -0.06 -0.06 -0.05 -0.01 0.07  0.21 0.28
Imports  0.01 0.02 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.06 0.09
Terms of trade, final goods  0.01  0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.00 -0.05  -0.14 -0.19
           
Nominal interest rate  0.04  0.06 0.06 0.06 0.05 0.02 0.00  0.00 0.00
Real interest rate  -0.04  -0.01 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01  0.00 0.00
Inflation 0.05  0.07 0.07 0.06 0.05 0.01 -0.01  -0.01 0.00
Consumer price inflation  0.04  0.06 0.06 0.06 0.05 0.01 -0.01  -0.01 0.00
Lump sum taxes (% of GDP)  0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.02 0.03 0.03 0.04
Unemployment rate  -0.02  -0.03 -0.03 -0.03 -0.03 -0.02 0.00  0.01 0.01
-low-skilled -0.01  -0.02 -0.03 -0.03 -0.03 -0.03 -0.01  0.00 0.01
-medium-skilled   -0.01  -0.01 -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 -0.01 0.00  0.01 0.01
-high-skilled  -0.21 -0.23 -0.15 -0.09 -0.07 -0.05 -0.04 -0.03 -0.03
Gov. balance (% of GDP) -0.02  -0.04 -0.05 -0.04 -0.04 -0.01 0.01  0.00 0.00
Current account (% of GDP)  0.00 -0.01 -0.03 -0.04 -0.06 -0.09 -0.09 -0.04 -0.01
R&D intensity (% of GDP)  0.10 0.13 0.14 0.15 0.15 0.14 0.12 0.10 0.09
Note: percentage (points) difference from baseline 
 
  283.4  Reducing fixed costs  
 
While financing costs of new start-ups and the absence of venture capital are more indirect 
examples of entry barriers, a more direct example of removing entry barriers can be simulated 
as a reduction in administrative entry barriers or fixed costs.  
 
Reduction in entry costs in  intermediate goods sector 
 
Table 3.4.a  shows the effects of a 10 per cent  reduction in fixed costs in the intermediate sector 
 (i.e. entry costs for intermediate firms).  Again, using the US as a benchmark, 
administrative costs for starting a new company are much larger in the EU compared to the 
US. However, one has to be careful when making a comparison as one important argument 
for a downward bias of the US level of entry regulation is the high standard of consumer 
protection legislation in the US. In the case of non-compliance, firms operating in the US are 
facing costly litigation procedures and high fines. Entry regulation in Europe can be seen as 
forcing firms to comply with certain health and safety standards. But given the wide variation 
of start-up costs in the EU it seems feasible to lower administrative entry costs towards levels 
prevailing in best practice countries. Here we look at the effects of reducing administrative 
entry barriers by 10%.  
A FC
 
Qualitatively the effects on the composition of investment (tangible vs. intangible) are similar 
to the experiment of reducing financing costs, since administrative entry barriers act like a 
sunk cost for potential entrants in the same way as financing costs do. However, initial 
financing costs exceed start-up costs significantly. Thus also a full elimination of start-up 
costs would not dramatically increase GDP. Decreasing entry costs lowers the profits 
requirement for intermediate producers and thus increases entry of new firms. As shown in 
Table 3.4.a, increased demand for patents increases the demand for high skilled worker and 
leads to some relocation of high skilled workers from production to the R&D sector and an 
increase in the wage of high skilled workers.  
 
Reduction in administrative burden 
 
Another example of a reduction in fixed costs is a reduction in the administrative burden. The 
EU has proposed to reduce this burden through a reduction of EU related regulation (which is 
estimated to constitute 35% of the total burden) by 25%. Consistent with the fixed cost nature 
of administrative costs, the reform is implemented as a reduction in overhead labour ( ).  L FC
 
A reduction in administrative costs is beneficial for firms since it reduces average production 
costs, i.e. less overhead labour is required for producing the same level of output. However, 
unlike an increase in labour augmenting technical progress, a reduction of fixed costs does not 
increase the marginal product of labour and therefore it leads to a downward shift in labour 
demand. It increases profitability of firms and therefore increases investment, however, as 
shown in Table 3.4.b below, the increase in investment is not strong enough to prevent 
employment from falling below the baseline level. The results show, a reduction in 
administrative burden is beneficial in terms of output, investment and consumption but it has 
negative employment effects. In this scenario, the overall macroeconomic impact of the 
reform does hardly exceed the direct cost reducing effect.  
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Years  EU 
1 2 3 4 5  10  20  50  100 
GDP 0.00  -0.01 -0.02 -0.02 -0.01 0.00 0.02  0.06 0.08
TFP  0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.04 0.07 0.07
"Ideas/Patents"  0.01 0.06 0.12 0.18 0.24 0.53 0.94 1.47 1.64
Capital  0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 -0.01 -0.01 0.02 0.05
Capital  intensity  0.00 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.03 0.06 0.10 0.16 0.18
Employment  0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
-low 0.00  0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 -0.01  -0.01 -0.01
-medium  0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
-high  -0.10 -0.24 -0.32 -0.37 -0.38 -0.37 -0.32 -0.27 -0.25
-R&D  0.69 1.30 1.55 1.64 1.68 1.60 1.40 1.15 1.07
Consumption 0.00  -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 0.00 0.02  0.05 0.07
Investment  0.00 0.00 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 0.00 0.03 0.06
Real  wages  0.01 0.02 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.04 0.06 0.09 0.11
-low  0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.04 0.07 0.09
-medium  0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.03 0.07 0.09
-high  0.10 0.21 0.26 0.28 0.28 0.27 0.26 0.26 0.27
Exports 0.00  -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 0.00 0.02  0.05 0.07
Imports  0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.02
Terms of trade, final goods  0.00  0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.00 -0.01  -0.03 -0.05
           
Nominal interest rate  0.01  0.01 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.00  0.00 0.00
Real  interest  rate  -0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Inflation  0.01 0.02 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Consumer price inflation  0.01  0.02 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.00  0.00 0.00
Lump sum taxes (% of GDP)  0.00 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01
Unemployment rate  -0.01  -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 0.00 0.00  0.00 0.00
-low-skilled  0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.01
-medium-skilled    0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 -0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
-high-skilled  -0.05 -0.06 -0.04 -0.02 -0.02 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01
Gov. balance (% of GDP)  0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 -0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Current account (% of GDP) 0.00  0.00 0.00 -0.01 -0.01 -0.02 -0.02  -0.01 0.00
R&D intensity (% of GDP)  0.03 0.03 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.03 0.03 0.02 0.02
Note: percentage (points) difference from baseline 
 
  30Table  3.4.b  10% reduction in final good firms' administrative burdens (overhead 
labour) 
Years  EU 
1 2 3 4 5  10  20  50  100 
GDP  0.42 0.52 0.54 0.56 0.57 0.62 0.69 0.80 0.83 
TFP  0.53 0.61 0.61 0.61 0.61 0.62 0.64 0.66 0.67 
"Ideas/Patents"  0.01 0.03 0.06 0.09 0.13 0.29 0.53 0.85 0.95 
Capital  0.01 0.02 0.04 0.06 0.08 0.17 0.31 0.51 0.59 
Capital  intensity  0.00 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.03 0.06 0.09 0.11 
Employment  -0.16 -0.14 -0.12 -0.10 -0.10 -0.09 -0.08 -0.08 -0.09 
-low -0.14  -0.13 -0.10 -0.07 -0.05  0.00  0.00  0.00 0.00 
-medium  -0.17 -0.16 -0.14 -0.12 -0.12 -0.12 -0.12 -0.12 -0.12 
-high  -0.24 -0.25 -0.26 -0.27 -0.29 -0.29 -0.27 -0.23 -0.22 
-R&D  0.32 0.65 0.82 0.90 0.93 0.91 0.81 0.67 0.62 
Consumption  0.34 0.52 0.54 0.54 0.54 0.55 0.58 0.65 0.67 
Investment  0.07 0.13 0.16 0.18 0.20 0.27 0.38 0.53 0.59 
Real wages  -0.01  -0.13 -0.18 -0.19 -0.18  -0.15  -0.08  0.01 0.04 
-low  -0.01 -0.14 -0.21 -0.24 -0.25 -0.22 -0.16 -0.06 -0.03 
-medium -0.01  -0.14 -0.18 -0.19 -0.19  -0.14  -0.07  0.02 0.05 
-high -0.01  -0.09 -0.09 -0.07 -0.06  -0.02  0.03  0.10 0.13 
Exports  0.37 0.42 0.42 0.44 0.46 0.51 0.58 0.67 0.70 
Imports  0.00 0.16 0.18 0.18 0.17 0.16 0.17 0.21 0.22 
Terms of trade, final goods  -0.27  -0.28 -0.28 -0.29 -0.30  -0.34  -0.39  -0.44 -0.46 
           
Nominal interest rate  0.00  -0.01 -0.01 -0.02 -0.03  -0.02  -0.01  0.01 0.00 
Real interest rate  -0.02  -0.01 0.01 0.02 0.01  0.01  0.00  0.00 0.00 
Inflation  -0.06 0.03 -0.01 -0.03 -0.04  -0.03  -0.01 0.01 0.00 
Consumer price inflation  0.05  0.01 -0.01 -0.03 -0.03  -0.03  -0.01  0.01 0.00 
Lump sum taxes (% of GDP)  0.03 0.07 0.10 0.13 0.15 0.20 0.23 0.22 0.22 
Unemployment  rate  0.15 0.13 0.11 0.09 0.09 0.08 0.07 0.07 0.07 
-low-skilled  0.13 0.12 0.09 0.06 0.04 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
-medium-skilled    0.16 0.15 0.13 0.12 0.11 0.11 0.11 0.11 0.11 
-high-skilled  0.13 0.07 0.05 0.04 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.06 
Gov. balance (% of GDP) -0.17  -0.11 -0.09 -0.06 -0.04  0.01  0.01  0.00 0.00 
Current account (% of GDP) 0.03  0.03 0.02 0.00 -0.02  -0.04  -0.03  -0.01 0.00 
R&D intensity (% of GDP)  0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Note: percentage (points) difference from baseline 
 
 
  313.5  Exogenous productivity improvements 
 
An exogenous productivity improvement shock is implemented as a 1 per cent increase of 
 in the production function of final output (eq. 13). Increasing the level of labour 
efficiency has a permanent positive effect on GDP, consumption and capital. The level effect 
is larger than would be predicted by a standard neoclassical growth model. The model 
generates a larger GDP effect because there is an endogenous R&D response to the TFP 
shock in the final goods sector. The increased demand for investment goods stimulates entry 




It is also noticeable that, even in the long run, consumption and investment do not increase 
fully proportionally with GDP. This is due to a terms of trade loss associated with an output 
and income expansion in only one country. The terms of trade effect impacts on real 
consumption in two ways. First it directly reduces consumption because imported 
consumption goods become more expensive. Second, consumption is reduced because the 
terms of trade effect has a negative effect on labour supply. In the case of investment, the real 
depreciation increases the price of capital via an increase in the price of imported investment 
goods and, second, the decline in labour input in the final goods sector lowers the marginal 
product of capital which further reduces the demand for physical capital
19.   
 
Concerning aggregate employment it is useful to distinguish between the short and the long 
term. In the short run, technical progress has a negative effect on employment because price 
rigidities prevent an immediate adjustment of prices to the new level of costs in the final 
goods sector. This generates a so-called demand externality (see Gali (1999)). Because of an 
insufficient decline in prices, individual firms are facing a shortfall of demand given their new 
level of productive capacity and find it beneficial to reduce employment. In the medium run 
there is a positive employment effect associated with the build up of new productive capacity. 
In the long run the employment effect remains slightly negative because of negative terms of 
trade effect. The negative terms of trade effect is also the reason behind the less than 
proportional increase in consumption and investment relative to GDP.  
 
The TFP shock also affects the skill premium positively. This is because the technology shock 
leads to an increase in the demand for R&D, which in turn raises the demand for high skilled 
workers over-proportionally. 
                                                 
19 Notice, the reduction in labour in final goods production exceeds the aggregate employment loss because of a 
reallocation of high skilled workers into the R&D sector. 
  32Table 3.5  A 1 percent permanent level increase of labour productivity 
Years after the shock  EU 
1 2 3 4 5  10  20  50  100 
GDP  0.57 0.76 0.78 0.77 0.77 0.81 0.89 0.98 1.01
TFP  0.60 0.74 0.74 0.74 0.74 0.75 0.75 0.76 0.76
"Ideas/Patents"  0.01 0.02 0.04 0.05 0.05 0.07 0.08 0.10 0.11
Capital  0.01 0.04 0.07 0.10 0.13 0.26 0.43 0.64 0.71
Capital  intensity  0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01
Employment -0.06  0.02 0.02 -0.01 -0.03 -0.05 -0.05  -0.04 -0.04
-low -0.04  0.03 0.03 0.00 -0.03 -0.07 -0.07  -0.06 -0.06
-medium -0.06  0.01 0.01 -0.01 -0.03 -0.04 -0.04  -0.04 -0.04
-high  -0.12 -0.04 -0.05 -0.07 -0.07 -0.05 -0.04 -0.04 -0.04
-R&D  0.29 0.41 0.33 0.23 0.16 0.09 0.08 0.07 0.07
Consumption  0.39 0.65 0.71 0.72 0.72 0.73 0.75 0.79 0.81
Investment  0.12 0.23 0.28 0.31 0.32 0.40 0.51 0.67 0.71
Real  wages  0.32 0.55 0.67 0.73 0.76 0.81 0.87 0.96 0.99
-low  0.30 0.51 0.64 0.71 0.76 0.82 0.89 0.97 1.00
-medium  0.32 0.55 0.67 0.73 0.75 0.80 0.87 0.96 0.98
-high  0.34 0.61 0.73 0.77 0.77 0.80 0.87 0.96 0.98
Exports  0.50 0.63 0.62 0.61 0.61 0.66 0.74 0.82 0.85
Imports  -0.09 0.10 0.19 0.22 0.23 0.23 0.23 0.25 0.26
Terms of trade, final goods  -0.37  -0.42 -0.41 -0.41 -0.41 -0.44 -0.49  -0.55 -0.56
           
Nominal interest rate  -0.12  -0.13 -0.09 -0.06 -0.05 -0.02 0.00  0.01 0.01
Real interest rate  0.09  -0.05 -0.03 -0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00  0.00 0.00
Inflation -0.25  -0.14 -0.08 -0.06 -0.05 -0.03 -0.01  0.01 0.01
Consumer price inflation  -0.08  -0.13 -0.09 -0.06 -0.05 -0.03 -0.01  0.01 0.01
Lump sum taxes (% of GDP)  0.04 0.05 0.03 0.02 0.01 0.00 0.02 0.04 0.05
Unemployment rate  0.05  -0.02 -0.01 0.01 0.03 0.05 0.04  0.04 0.04
-low-skilled 0.04  -0.03 -0.03 0.00 0.02 0.07 0.06  0.05 0.05
-medium-skilled   0.06  -0.01 -0.01 0.01 0.03 0.04 0.04  0.04 0.04
-high-skilled 0.04  -0.04 -0.02 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.02  0.02 0.02
Gov. balance (% of GDP) -0.08  0.09 0.08 0.06 0.03 0.00 -0.01  -0.01 0.00
Current account (% of GDP) 0.05  0.11 0.12 0.12 0.11 0.05 0.00  -0.01 0.00
R&D intensity (% of GDP)  0.01 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Note: percentage (points) difference from baseline 
  333.6  Reducing wage mark-ups 
 
In monopolistically competitive labour markets, households act as wage setters and can 
charge a wage mark-up    over the reservation wage (the ratio of the marginal disutility 
of labour to the marginal utility of consumption). The mark-up depends on the intratemporal 
elasticity of substitution between the differentiated labour services supplied and a lower mark-
up implies a reduction in monopoly power of workers (or trade unions) and an increase in 
substitutability among different labour services. Institutional reforms in the labour market that 
reduce this mark-up will unambiguously raise the employment rate. In the simulation reported 
in Table 3.6 the shock to the mark-up is calibrated such that it yields a 1 percentage point 
increase in the employment rate in the medium term
W
t η / 1
20. 
 
Lowering the mark-up reduces wages and gradually raises employment. Although the 
proportional change in the mark-up is the same for all three skill groups, the employment rate 
on the baseline is highest for the high-skilled group and lowest for low-skilled. Hence, the 
same increase in employment is a proportionally larger reduction in leisure for the high- 
skilled and this puts upward pressure on their wages.  As a result, the low-skilled have the 
strongest decline in their wages, the high-skilled the least strong decline, and the increase in 
the employment rate is largest for the low-skilled and smallest for the high-skilled. 
 
The increase in employment boosts output, but during the first years of the simulation the 
increase in GDP is smaller than that in employment, reflecting a negative trade-off in 
productivity. In the long run however, the GDP effect becomes larger due to an endogenous 
R&D response. A higher employment rate of high-skilled employed in the R&D sector as 
well as increased demand for new patents from entry of new firms in the intermediate sector 
boosts output of the R&D sector ("ideas/patents") and raises total productivity. Lower wages 
reduce consumption of liquidity-constrained households, but this is more than offset by higher 
consumption of non-liquidity constrained households due to the increase in permanent 
income. The increase in output must lead to a fall in the relative price of domestic goods in 
order to balance supply and demand and the terms-of-trade deteriorate. Consumption and 
investment grow proportionally less than GDP, due to this terms-of-trade loss. 
 
                                                 
20 Our estimates of the elasticities of substitution among differentiated labour inputs σs are unfortunately not well 
identified, as the data does not allow separate identification of this parameter and the preference parameter for 
leisure ωs . We define this shock therefore in terms of the outcome it yields for employment. 
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Years after the shock  EU 
1 2 3 4 5  10  20  50  100 
GDP  0.09 0.42 0.59 0.67 0.72 0.84 0.98 1.14 1.20
TFP  -0.03 0.07 0.09 0.11 0.12 0.15 0.19 0.22 0.22
"Ideas/Patents"  0.01 0.03 0.06 0.11 0.15 0.33 0.59 0.91 1.01
Capital  0.00 0.00 0.02 0.04 0.06 0.19 0.41 0.72 0.84
Capital  intensity  0.00 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.04 0.07 0.10 0.11
Employment  0.20 0.58 0.79 0.89 0.93 0.99 1.02 1.04 1.04
-low  0.34 0.91 1.29 1.50 1.60 1.68 1.72 1.75 1.76
-medium  0.16 0.49 0.66 0.72 0.75 0.80 0.84 0.85 0.85
-high  0.04 0.22 0.25 0.24 0.23 0.28 0.35 0.39 0.39
-R&D  0.28 0.73 0.99 1.09 1.11 1.01 0.85 0.71 0.67
Consumption  0.21 0.42 0.54 0.61 0.66 0.77 0.85 0.93 0.96
Investment  0.00 0.06 0.13 0.18 0.23 0.35 0.52 0.76 0.84
Real  wages  -0.29 -0.55 -0.57 -0.52 -0.47 -0.33 -0.20 -0.06 -0.01
-low  -0.43 -0.89 -1.03 -1.04 -0.99 -0.81 -0.68 -0.55 -0.50
-medium -0.26  -0.47 -0.46 -0.39 -0.33 -0.19 -0.06  0.09 0.14
-high -0.15  -0.20 -0.09 0.01 0.06 0.17 0.29  0.42 0.46
Exports  -0.04 0.31 0.46 0.53 0.56 0.66 0.81 0.96 1.01
Imports  0.08 0.05 0.07 0.10 0.14 0.22 0.26 0.29 0.31
Terms of trade, final goods  0.03  -0.22 -0.31 -0.35 -0.37 -0.44 -0.53  -0.64 -0.67
           
Nominal interest rate  -0.44  -0.61 -0.61 -0.56 -0.49 -0.25 -0.07  0.01 0.01
Real  interest  rate  0.36 0.13 0.05 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.00
Inflation -0.54  -0.77 -0.71 -0.63 -0.55 -0.27 -0.08  0.01 0.01
Consumer price inflation  -0.52  -0.67 -0.67 -0.62 -0.54 -0.27 -0.08  0.01 0.01
Lump sum taxes (% of GDP) 0.03  0.06 0.03 -0.01 -0.05 -0.20 -0.26  -0.21 -0.19
Unemployment  rate  -0.19 -0.55 -0.76 -0.86 -0.90 -0.95 -0.99 -1.00 -1.00
-low-skilled  -0.30 -0.82 -1.16 -1.35 -1.44 -1.51 -1.54 -1.57 -1.58
-medium-skilled    -0.15 -0.45 -0.61 -0.67 -0.69 -0.74 -0.78 -0.79 -0.79
-high-skilled  -0.08 -0.30 -0.38 -0.39 -0.38 -0.41 -0.43 -0.43 -0.43
Gov. balance (% of GDP) 0.19  0.46 0.52 0.49 0.43 0.18 0.02  -0.02 -0.01
Current account (% of GDP)  -0.03 -0.03 -0.01 0.02 0.03 0.04 -0.01 -0.02 0.00
R&D intensity (% of GDP)  0.00 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00
Note: percentage (points) difference from baseline 
  353.7  Tax shift from labour tax to consumption tax  
 
Shifting the burden of taxation from direct taxes towards indirect taxes may yield positive 
labour market effects. Labour supply (and therefore wages) depends on the total tax burden of 
a worker household, but by shifting the tax burden from wage income to other sources of 
income, like transfer income, profit and interest income, total distortions on employment 
decisions can be reduced and one could expect favourable labour supply effects from such a 
tax shift.  
 
The effects of a switch from labour to consumption taxation will depend on how other income 
groups are compensated for the tax increase. The simulation shown in Table 3.7 shows the 
effects of the reduction in labour taxes    and an increase in consumption taxes   of 1 
percent of (baseline) GDP under the assumption of benefit and transfer indexation to 
consumer prices. The reduction in labour tax leads to an increase in employment and in 
output. The budgetary impact is more complex as there are many channels affecting the 
budget either directly or indirectly. As the reform consists of changes in tax rates, there is a 
direct impact on the budget, but the shift is constructed to be ex ante budgetary neutral on the 
baseline. The budget is indirectly affected as the reform is accompanied by compensatory 
payments for benefit and transfer recipients and there is a further indirect effect from changes 
in expenditures and in the tax bases due to the macroeconomic impact of the reform. A loss in 
the terms of trade has a negative impact on consumption and leads to less consumption tax 
revenue. The net effect is an initial increase in the government deficit and in order to stabilise 







Layard et al. (1991) have raised doubts about the potential gains from a shift in taxation 
towards indirect taxes based on the empirical observation that real wages will only fall 
temporarily after such a tax shock. Interestingly real wage costs only fall temporarily in these 
simulations as well. Nevertheless there is a real positive employment and GDP effect. This 
can be explained when we take into account various dynamic adjustment mechanisms. The 
basic intuition behind this result is the fact that a temporary increase in employment leads to 
an increase in the capital stock in the medium term until the pre-existing capital-labour ratio is 
re-established. However once the initial capital-labour ratio is re-established the marginal 
product of labour returns to its initial level and therefore real wages that firms are willing to 
pay return to the baseline level at a higher level of employment and capital. For a more 
detailed discussion of the short and long term effects of such a tax shift see European 
Commission (2008), part IV. 
 
Note again that the long run output effect of this tax shift is proportionally larger than the 
increase in employment and capital accumulation due to an endogenous R&D increase. 
Employment in the R&D sector is higher and the increase in output ("ideas/patents") leads to 
an increase in total productivity. 
                                                 
21 If however the same scenario is ran under the assumption that labour taxes have to be changed to stabilise 
government debt at its target, the ex post labour tax reduction would be considerably smaller and the 
employment and output effects proportionally lower.  
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Table 3.7  A 1 percent of GDP tax shift from labour to VAT, lump-sum tax 
Years after the shock  EU 
1 2 3 4 5  10  20  50  100 
GDP  0.06 0.12 0.17 0.19 0.20 0.24 0.28 0.34 0.35 
TFP  0.01 0.02 0.03 0.03 0.04 0.05 0.06 0.06 0.07 
"Ideas/Patents"  0.00 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.03 0.09 0.16 0.27 0.30 
Capital  0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.04 0.11 0.21 0.25 
Capital  intensity  0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.02 0.03 0.03 
Employment  0.07 0.17 0.22 0.25 0.27 0.29 0.30 0.31 0.31 
-low  0.10 0.24 0.34 0.40 0.43 0.48 0.50 0.51 0.51 
-medium  0.07 0.15 0.19 0.21 0.22 0.24 0.25 0.25 0.25 
-high  0.04 0.08 0.09 0.08 0.08 0.09 0.10 0.11 0.12 
-R&D  0.05 0.15 0.23 0.27 0.28 0.29 0.26 0.21 0.20 
Consumption  0.20 0.17 0.17 0.18 0.19 0.21 0.24 0.27 0.28 
Investment  -0.01 0.00 0.02 0.03 0.04 0.09 0.14 0.22 0.25 
Real  wages  -0.09 -0.15 -0.16 -0.15 -0.14 -0.10 -0.06 -0.02 0.00 
-low  -0.12 -0.23 -0.27 -0.27 -0.27 -0.24 -0.20 -0.16 -0.14 
-medium -0.08  -0.13 -0.13 -0.12 -0.10  -0.06  -0.02  0.02 0.04 
-high -0.05  -0.06 -0.04 -0.01 0.01  0.04  0.08  0.12 0.14 
Exports  -0.04 0.07 0.13 0.15 0.16 0.20 0.24 0.28 0.30 
Imports  0.13 0.06 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.05 0.07 0.09 0.09 
Terms of trade, final goods  0.03  -0.05 -0.09 -0.10 -0.11  -0.13  -0.16  -0.19 -0.20 
           
Nominal interest rate  -0.11  -0.16 -0.17 -0.16 -0.14  -0.07  -0.02  0.00 0.00 
Real  interest  rate  0.12 0.05 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Inflation -0.14  -0.22 -0.20 -0.18 -0.16  -0.08  -0.03  0.00 0.00 
Consumer price inflation  -0.14  -0.19 -0.19 -0.18 -0.16  -0.08  -0.03  0.00 0.00 
Labour tax rate  -1.68  -1.68 -1.68 -1.68 -1.68  -1.68  -1.68  -1.68 -1.68 
-low  skilled  -1.68 -1.68 -1.68 -1.68 -1.68 -1.68 -1.68 -1.68 -1.68 
-medium  skilled  -1.68 -1.68 -1.68 -1.68 -1.68 -1.68 -1.68 -1.68 -1.68 
-high  skilled  -1.68 -1.68 -1.68 -1.68 -1.68 -1.68 -1.68 -1.68 -1.68 
Corporate tax rate  0.00  0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00 0.00 
Consumption tax rate   1.75  1.75 1.75 1.75 1.75 1.75 1.75 1.75 1.75 
Lump sum taxes (% of GDP)  0.04 0.09 0.11 0.13 0.14 0.15 0.14 0.13 0.13 
Unemployment  rate  -0.07 -0.16 -0.21 -0.24 -0.26 -0.28 -0.29 -0.29 -0.29 
-low-skilled  -0.09 -0.22 -0.31 -0.36 -0.39 -0.43 -0.45 -0.46 -0.46 
-medium-skilled    -0.06 -0.14 -0.18 -0.20 -0.21 -0.22 -0.23 -0.23 -0.23 
-high-skilled  -0.04 -0.09 -0.11 -0.11 -0.11 -0.12 -0.13 -0.13 -0.13 
Gov. balance (% of GDP)  -0.09 0.01 0.05 0.07 0.08 0.06 0.02 0.00 0.00 
Current account (% of GDP) -0.04  -0.07 -0.07 -0.07 -0.07  -0.04  -0.01  0.00 0.00 
R&D intensity (% of GDP)  0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Note: percentage (points) difference from baseline 
  373.8  Shift in labour tax from low skilled to high skilled workers 
 
 
Another tax shift simulated here is shifting the burden of taxation from low-skilled workers to 
high-skilled workers. As the average employment rate for low-skilled workers in the EU is so 
much lower than that for medium- and high-skilled workers, many member states have 
focussed their reforms towards policies that aim to raise the employment rate of this group by 
reducing their tax burden. For instance, in the period 2000 to 2006, the total tax wedge for 
low-skilled workers has been reduced by almost 4 percent
22. 
 
Table 3.8 shows the macro economic impact of a 1 per cent of GDP shift from low-skilled to 
high-skilled workers. The reduction in the tax wedge for low-skilled workers amounts to a 
decline in wage taxes of roughly 8 percentage points, while taxes for high-skilled workers (a 
smaller group) rise by almost twice that. Lower taxes for low-skilled workers increase 
employment for that skill group, higher taxes for high skilled reduce their employment rate. 
Total employment increases by 0.7 percent. There is a negative endogenous TFP effect as 
employment in the R&D sector declines, and this reduces the GDP impact in the long run. 
GDP is 0.19 percent higher after 10 years but only 0.05 per cent higher in the long run. 
                                                 
22 Based on the change in the total tax wedge (including social security contributions by employees and 
employers) for representative groups of earners (percentage relative to average wage) over the period 2000 to 
2006. 
  38Table 3.8  1% of GDP tax shift from low to high skilled labour 
Years  EU 
1 2 3 4 5  10  20  50  100 
GDP  0.11 0.09 0.13 0.16 0.18 0.19 0.17 0.10 0.05
TFP  -0.01 -0.14 -0.18 -0.20 -0.22 -0.25 -0.31 -0.39 -0.42
"Ideas/Patents"  -0.02 -0.11 -0.26 -0.44 -0.64 -1.54 -2.80 -4.37 -4.84
Capital  0.00  -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 0.03 0.09 0.10 0.04
Capital  intensity  0.00 -0.01 -0.03 -0.05 -0.07 -0.17 -0.32 -0.50 -0.55
Employment  0.17 0.32 0.44 0.52 0.56 0.61 0.65 0.67 0.67
-low  1.03 2.34 3.19 3.65 3.85 3.94 3.96 3.98 3.98
-medium  0.04 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.07 0.11 0.12 0.12
-high  -1.55 -3.53 -4.58 -5.05 -5.23 -5.27 -5.34 -5.49 -5.54
-R&D  -1.11 -2.91 -4.17 -4.86 -5.16 -4.91 -4.22 -3.43 -3.20
Consumption  0.62 0.13 0.06 0.08 0.10 0.15 0.14 0.07 0.04
Investment  -0.05  -0.05 -0.02 0.01 0.03 0.08 0.12 0.09 0.04
Real  wages  -0.20 -0.40 -0.51 -0.55 -0.55 -0.53 -0.53 -0.59 -0.64
-low  -1.25 -2.40 -2.82 -2.90 -2.85 -2.70 -2.71 -2.79 -2.83
-medium  -0.05 -0.05 -0.04 -0.04 -0.03 -0.03 -0.05 -0.13 -0.17
-high  1.73 3.27 3.80 3.96 3.99 3.96 4.02 4.07 4.06
Exports  -0.20 0.04 0.14 0.17 0.17 0.16 0.14 0.08 0.04
Imports  0.47 0.03 -0.08 -0.07 -0.05 0.01 0.05 0.03 0.01
Terms of trade, final goods  0.15  -0.03 -0.10 -0.11 -0.11  -0.11  -0.09  -0.05 -0.03
      
Nominal interest rate  -0.23  -0.36 -0.39 -0.37 -0.33  -0.16  -0.04  0.00 0.00
Real interest rate  0.29 0.11 0.03 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Inflation  -0.27 -0.51 -0.45 -0.41 -0.36 -0.17 -0.04  0.00 0.00
Consumer price inflation  -0.32  -0.43 -0.43 -0.40 -0.36  -0.17  -0.04  0.00 0.00
Labour tax rate  0.00  0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00 0.00
-low  skilled  -8.41 -8.41 -8.41 -8.41 -8.41 -8.41 -8.41 -8.41 -8.41
-medium  skilled  0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
-high  skilled  14.47 14.47 14.47 14.47 14.47 14.47 14.47 14.47 14.47
Corporate tax rate  0.00  0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00 0.00
Consumption tax rate   0.00  0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Lump sum taxes (% of GDP)  0.01 0.04 0.05 0.05 0.04 0.00  -0.04  -0.05 -0.05
Unemployment  rate  -0.21 -0.43 -0.60 -0.69 -0.74 -0.79 -0.82 -0.84 -0.84
-low-skilled  -0.92 -2.10 -2.87 -3.28 -3.46 -3.54 -3.56 -3.58 -3.58
-medium-skilled    -0.04 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.02 -0.07 -0.10 -0.11 -0.11
-high-skilled  1.41 3.27 4.31 4.81 5.00 4.99 4.91 4.88 4.88
Gov. balance (% of GDP)  0.16 0.23 0.26 0.25 0.23 0.12 0.02 0.00 0.00
Current account (% of GDP)  -0.14 -0.22 -0.20 -0.15 -0.11 -0.01  0.05  0.02 0.00
R&D intensity (% of GDP)  0.01 -0.01 -0.02 -0.03 -0.03 -0.02 -0.01  0.01 0.01
Note: percentage (points) difference from baseline 
  393.9  Reducing unemployment benefit generosity 
 
Households set wages by maximising a weighted average of their utility functions and the 
wage rule in the model is obtained by equating the ratio between a weighted average of the 
marginal utility of leisure and a weighted average of the marginal utility of consumption, to 
the difference between the real wage and unemployment benefits, adjusted for a mark-up.  
Unemployment benefits act in the model like a subsidy to leisure. A reduction in the benefit 
replacement rate is like a reduction in the reservation wage, puts downward pressure on 
wages and so boosts labour demand.  
 
The effects of a reduction in   of 5 percentage points for all three skill groups are shown in 
Table 3.9. The impact on output and employment are similar to those of a reduction in the 
wage mark-up. Lower wage income reduces consumption of liquidity-constrained 
households, but this is more than offset by an increase in consumption of non-liquidity- 
constrained households due to higher permanent income. As the employment rate on the 
baseline is lowest for the low-skilled group, the same increase in employment is a 
proportionally smaller reduction in leisure for this group and this puts less upward pressure on 
their wages.  As a result, the decline in wages for low-skilled is larger than that for other skill 
groups, and the increase in their employment is also larger. Our estimated average positive 
employment effect of 1.8% is however large compared to other recent empirical evidence as 
provided for example by Bassanini and Duval (2006). Their estimates suggest an employment 
effect in the range between 0.5 and 0.6% for a similar reduction in the replacement rate. 




The dynamic adjustment of real wages, employment and productivity are similar to the 
previous case of a reduction in the wage mark-up. The benefit reduction acts like a negative 
shock to wages, which increases the demand for labour and reduces labour productivity 
initially. Wages and productivity increase over time and return to their baseline values as 
investment picks up. Unlike in a model with exogenous technical progress there is a small 
positive long term productivity effect due to a higher employment rate of high-skilled workers 
in the R&D sector as well as increased demand for new patents from entry of new firms in the 
intermediate sector. 
 
  40Table 3.9  A 5 pp reduction in the benefit replacement rate 
Years after the shock  EU 
1 2 3 4 5  10  20  50  100 
GDP 0.15  0.77 1.07 1.22 1.30 1.52 1.77  2.06 2.16 
TFP -0.07  0.12 0.16 0.19 0.21 0.28 0.34  0.39 0.40 
"Ideas/Patents" 0.01  0.05 0.12 0.20 0.28 0.61 1.07  1.64 1.83 
Capital 0.00  0.01 0.04 0.08 0.13 0.36 0.74  1.30 1.51 
Capital intensity  0.00  0.01 0.01 0.02 0.03 0.07 0.12  0.18 0.20 
Employment 0.35  1.05 1.45 1.62 1.69 1.78 1.85  1.88 1.88 
-low 0.61  1.68 2.37 2.74 2.92 3.02 3.08  3.15 3.17 
-medium 0.28  0.88 1.19 1.31 1.36 1.45 1.52  1.54 1.53 
-high 0.05  0.38 0.44 0.42 0.40 0.51 0.63  0.70 0.71 
-R&D 0.53  1.39 1.85 2.03 2.06 1.83 1.53  1.28 1.20 
Consumption 0.30  0.71 0.95 1.09 1.19 1.40 1.54  1.68 1.73 
Investment 0.01  0.13 0.26 0.35 0.43 0.65 0.94  1.36 1.52 
Real wages  -0.53  -1.01 -1.04 -0.94 -0.85 -0.58 -0.36  -0.10 -0.02 
-low -0.80  -1.64 -1.90 -1.88 -1.79 -1.43 -1.19  -0.97 -0.89 
-medium -0.47  -0.86 -0.83 -0.70 -0.59 -0.35 -0.11  0.15 0.25 
-high -0.28  -0.36 -0.15 0.02 0.12 0.32 0.52  0.75 0.83 
Exports -0.05  0.59 0.85 0.96 1.01 1.19 1.45  1.73 1.82 
Imports 0.08  0.05 0.11 0.18 0.25 0.41 0.47  0.53 0.56 
Terms of trade, final goods  0.04  -0.41 -0.57 -0.64 -0.67 -0.79 -0.96  -1.14 -1.19 
           
Nominal interest rate  -0.81  -1.11 -1.11 -1.02 -0.89 -0.44 -0.12  0.01 0.01 
Real interest rate  0.65  0.22 0.09 0.03 0.01 0.01 0.01  0.00 0.00 
Inflation -0.98  -1.39 -1.28 -1.14 -0.98 -0.49 -0.14  0.01 0.01 
Consumer price inflation  -0.94  -1.22 -1.22 -1.11 -0.98 -0.48 -0.14  0.01 0.01 
Lump sum taxes (% of GDP) 0.02  0.02 -0.06 -0.16 -0.26 -0.57 -0.67  -0.57 -0.52 
Unemployment rate  -0.34  -1.01 -1.39 -1.56 -1.63 -1.72 -1.78  -1.81 -1.81 
-low-skilled -0.55  -1.51 -2.13 -2.47 -2.62 -2.71 -2.77  -2.83 -2.85 
-medium-skilled   -0.26  -0.82 -1.11 -1.22 -1.26 -1.34 -1.41  -1.43 -1.42 
-high-skilled -0.14  -0.55 -0.69 -0.70 -0.70 -0.74 -0.77  -0.78 -0.78 
Gov. balance (% of GDP) 0.54  0.96 1.02 0.94 0.81 0.30 0.01  -0.03 -0.01 
Current account (% of GDP) -0.03  -0.02 0.04 0.09 0.12 0.11 -0.02  -0.05 -0.01 
R&D intensity (% of GDP) 0.00  0.01 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.01 0.01  0.00 0.00 
Note: percentage (points) difference from baseline 
  413.10  Improving human capital  
 
Compared to the US, Europe employs a relatively large share of low skilled workers (35% vs. 
12%) while the share of medium skilled in the US is substantially higher compared to the EU 
(80% vs. 58%)
23. Table 3.10a shows the simulation results of increasing the EU medium-
skilled labour share. The shock is designed to linearly increase the share of medium-skilled 
workers by 1 percentage point after 40 years and decrease the low-skilled share accordingly. 
The output effect is gradually building up as the share of medium-skilled workers is 
increasing relative to the low-skilled share, with a positive impact of 0.17 per cent after 20 
years and around 0.41 per cent in the long run, when the full adjustment in population shares 
has taken place. The additional medium-skilled labour will be employed at higher efficiency 
than the replaced low-skilled workers in the production of final goods, with decreasing skill-
premium relative to the other skill-groups (low,- and high-skilled). The results are in line with 
previous study by de la Fuente (2003) on the social returns to education. The author estimated 
the long-term productivity impact of an extra year's schooling in the EU at 9.3%. Our 
simulation corresponds to a 0.043 year increase in the average years of schooling with an EU-
wide productivity increase of 0.19%. Implied by imperfect substitutability between different 
types of workers, an increase in the share of medium-skilled workers has positive wage 
effects, especially for low-skilled workers. 
 
The share of high skilled labour in the EU is 1.4 percentage point less compared to the US 
(6.2% vs. 7.6%). Table 3.10b shows the effects of increasing the EU high-skilled labour share 
by 1 percentage point after 40 years and decreasing the medium-skilled share accordingly. 
The large fraction of the additional high skilled labour will be employed in the production of 
final goods (replacing the less efficient medium skilled workers).  However, after five years 
there is an increase in employment in the R&D sector because of a decline in the wage of high 
skilled workers. This reduces the price of patents and stimulates entry in the intermediate 
goods sector. In the first five years of the simulation the anticipated decline in the price of 
patents exceeds the reduction of high skilled wages therefore R&D production and R&D 
employment slightly decline. Increasing the high-skilled share results in a much stronger 'real' 
R&D effect in terms of R&D employment and patent-growth in the medium and long run 
which explains the significantly higher output effect compared to the previous scenario. 
Output is gradually building up with a positive impact of 0.26 per cent after 20 years and 
around 1.40 per cent in the long run. Notice that the employment share of R&D workers 
increases over time but the nominal R&D share declines because of the wage reduction. 
 
The larger GDP effect in the second scenario originates largely from two sources. First, the 
difference in the marginal product of labour between high skilled and medium skilled is larger 
than the corresponding difference between medium skilled and low skilled and, second, 
because high skilled workers have a lower share compared to medium skilled workers, a 1 
percentage point increase in high skilled workers constitutes a larger percentage increase of 
high skilled compared to a 1 percentage point increase of medium skilled workers. 
 
                                                 
23 The qualification levels of the skill groups are not comparable between the EU and the US. In particular, the 
qualification level of the low skilled in the US is lower compared to the same group in the EU.  
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Table 3.10.a  A 1 pp increase of the share of medium skilled workers 
EU  Years after the shock 
  1 2 3 4 5  10  20  50  100 
GDP  0.00 0.01 0.02 0.03 0.04 0.08 0.17 0.38 0.41
TFP  0.00 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.04 0.08 0.17 0.18
"Ideas/Patents"  0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.03 0.06 0.17 0.20
Capital  0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.02 0.06 0.22 0.29
Capital  intensity  0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.02 0.02
Employment  0.00 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.03 0.05 0.10 0.20 0.21
-low  -0.05 -0.12 -0.20 -0.28 -0.36 -0.77 -1.58 -3.24 -3.24
-medium  0.02 0.06 0.10 0.13 0.17 0.35 0.72 1.47 1.47
-high  -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.02 -0.02 -0.03 -0.04 -0.03
-R&D  0.02 0.04 0.06 0.07 0.08 0.10 0.14 0.15 0.14
Consumption  -0.01  -0.01 0.00 0.01 0.02 0.06 0.14 0.32 0.33
Investment  0.00 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.04 0.10 0.24 0.29
Real  wages  0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.02 0.04 0.12 0.15
-low  0.04 0.10 0.16 0.22 0.28 0.60 1.24 2.61 2.64
-medium  -0.01 -0.04 -0.06 -0.08 -0.10 -0.21 -0.42 -0.82 -0.79
-high  0.01 0.01 0.02 0.03 0.03 0.06 0.11 0.25 0.28
Exports  0.01 0.02 0.03 0.03 0.04 0.06 0.14 0.32 0.35
Imports -0.01  -0.01  -0.01 -0.01 0.00 0.02  0.05  0.10 0.11
Terms of trade, final goods  0.00  -0.01  -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 -0.04  -0.09  -0.21 -0.23
           
Nominal interest rate  -0.01  -0.02  -0.02 -0.03 -0.03 -0.04  -0.04  0.00 0.00
Real  interest  rate  0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Inflation  -0.02 -0.02 -0.03 -0.03 -0.03 -0.04 -0.04 -0.01 0.00
Consumer price inflation  -0.01  -0.02  -0.02 -0.03 -0.03 -0.04  -0.04  -0.01 0.00
Lump sum taxes  (% of GDP)  0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.03 0.03
Unemployment  rate  0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.02 0.03 0.03
-low-skilled  0.00 -0.01 -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 -0.03 -0.05 -0.08 -0.09
-medium-skilled    0.00 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.05 0.09 0.09
-high-skilled  0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Share of low skilled  -0.02  -0.04  -0.07 -0.09 -0.12 -0.24  -0.49  -1.00 -1.00
- medium skilled  0.02  0.04  0.07 0.09 0.12 0.24  0.49  1.00 1.00
-  high-skilled  0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Gov. balance (% of GDP)  0.00 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.00 0.00
Current account (% of GDP)  0.00 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.03 0.05 0.07 0.01 0.00
R&D intensity (% of GDP)  0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Note: percentage (points) difference from baseline 
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Table 3.10.b  A 1 pp increase of the share of high skilled workers 
Years after the shock  EU 
1 2 3 4 5  10  20  50  100 
GDP  0.01 0.03 0.04 0.05 0.06 0.11 0.26 0.93 1.40
TFP  0.01 0.02 0.03 0.04 0.05 0.11 0.27 0.85 1.08
"Ideas/Patents" -0.01  -0.04 -0.07 -0.08 -0.09 0.14 1.57  10.10 14.76
Capital  0.00 0.00 0.00 -0.01 -0.01 -0.02 -0.01 0.31 0.89
Capital  intensity  0.00 0.00 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 0.02 0.17 1.08 1.55
Employment  0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.03 0.07 0.12 0.10
-low 0.00  0.00 0.00 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.02  -0.07 -0.08
-medium  -0.02 -0.06 -0.10 -0.14 -0.18 -0.37 -0.75 -1.54 -1.55
-high 0.34  0.86 1.34 1.76 2.16 4.07 7.95  16.10 16.61
-R&D -0.51  -0.78 -0.64 -0.34 0.03 2.05 5.74  12.08 9.81
Consumption  0.05 0.08 0.09 0.10 0.10 0.14 0.26 0.79 1.13
Investment -0.01  -0.01 -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 -0.03 0.00  0.41 0.93
Real wages  -0.01  -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 0.00 0.04 0.15  0.72 1.12
-low  0.00 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.03 0.06 0.17 0.77 1.21
-medium  0.02 0.06 0.09 0.12 0.15 0.32 0.70 1.84 2.29
-high  -0.26 -0.66 -0.98 -1.26 -1.52 -2.77 -5.18 -9.46 -9.37
Exports  0.00 0.00 0.01 0.02 0.03 0.08 0.22 0.79 1.18
Imports  0.03 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.06 0.21 0.36
Terms of trade, final goods  0.00  0.00 -0.01 -0.01 -0.02 -0.05 -0.14  -0.52 -0.78
           
Nominal interest rate  0.00  0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.01  -0.02 0.01
Real  interest  rate  0.00 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.00
Inflation  0.00 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 0.00 0.00 -0.01 -0.04 0.01
Consumer price inflation  0.00  0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 -0.01  -0.03 0.01
Lump sum taxes (% of GDP)  0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.06 0.09
Unemployment  rate  0.00 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.03 0.05
-low-skilled  0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.06 0.07
-medium-skilled   0.00  0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 -0.01 -0.02  -0.03 -0.02
-high-skilled  0.07 0.10 0.09 0.08 0.09 0.14 0.26 0.51 0.53
Share of low skilled  0.00  0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00  0.00 0.00
- medium skilled  -0.02  -0.04 -0.07 -0.09 -0.12 -0.24 -0.49  -1.00 -1.00
-  high-skilled  0.02 0.04 0.07 0.09 0.12 0.24 0.49 1.00 1.00
Gov. balance (% of GDP)  0.01 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 -0.01
Current account (% of GDP)  -0.01 -0.02 -0.04 -0.06 -0.08 -0.15 -0.25 -0.20 -0.03
R&D intensity (% of GDP) -0.03  -0.03 -0.03 -0.03 -0.03 -0.02 0.00  0.01 -0.03
Note: percentage (points) difference from baseline 
 
 
  445.   Conclusions 
 
In this paper we described a micro-founded DSGE model with endogenous growth that can be 
used to analyse the macroeconomic impact of structural reforms in Europe. The new QUEST 
III model allows us to explicitly model the reforms in terms of concrete and quantifiable 
policy measures, in particular fiscal policy instruments such as taxes, benefits, subsidies and 
education expenditures, administrative costs faced by firms and regulatory indices. This 
makes the model a useful tool for analysing the costs and benefits of structural reforms. Our 
results confirm the beneficial effects on output and employment of skill-biased tax reforms, 
measures that improve the skill composition of the labour force, R&D subsidies, raising 
competition in final goods market, increased financial market integration and measures that 
remove entry barriers in certain markets. The model also allows us to examine the adjustment 
path and the time lags involved before these benefits can be reaped.  
The model can also be used to study possible sources for the productivity gap between the EU 
and the US and look at policies which could help to close this gap. In Roeger et al. (2008) we 
identify differences in product market competition, labour taxation, R&D subsidies, entry 
costs, skill composition of the labour force and R&D technology and examine how 
differences in these factors account for differences in productivity, employment, skill 
premium and R&D expenditure. We are currently setting up such models for all EU member 
states, using country specific information on basic country specific structural characteristic. 
One can think of many directions in which this model can be extended. A further 
disaggregation of taxes would be desirable to fully capture the differential impacts individual 
taxes can have on the economy. Further work is also needed to endogenise the skill premium, 
possibly by looking more into human capital formation, and to examine differences in the 
efficiency of the R&D sector.  
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  49Appendix A. Calibrating the parameters of knowledge production and 
intermediate goods production 
 
 
We start from the Jones (1995) version of R&D modelling, but we account for the 
international R&D spillovers following Bottazzi and Peri (2007): 
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The first equation is the spillover-augmented version of Jones(1995) R&D production. This 
form of R&D equation accounts for international spillovers almost identically to the 
specification of  Bottazzi and Peri (2007). Equation (b) states the steady-state relationship 
between the growth of ideas  gA  and population  gn  , equation (c) shows the first order 
condition of R&D production, equation (d) is the definition of R&D-intensity: total R&D 
expenditure of the intermediate sector in percentage of GDP. Equation (e) states the free-entry 
condition between the profit of the intermediate sector ( t π ), and the per unit price of R&D 
inventions ( ) and the fixed (entry) cost    . Equation (f) defines the rental rate of 
intangible capital. Since one unit of capital is used to produce one unit of intermediate good 
(
A P A FC
xt), equation (g) states the identity between the total intermediate goods production and 
physical capital under symmetric equilibrium. 
 
A.1.  R&D production 
Although we do not have direct estimates of  ν ,  ϖ ,  φ  and λ , we can use the existing 
literature and the model restrictions to get calibrated values for them. Data on the R&D share 





A P Δ ,
A g n g
                                                
  is obtained from EUROSTAT, the values 
of    and   are given in our baseline model
24. These values together with the restrictions 
 
24 Pessoa (2005) provides estimates for the growth of patents or ideas in various OECD countries at an average 
  50of the balanced growth dynamics and the other variables of the baseline pin down  λ  and  . 
In order to set 
A P
φ  and ϖ  in the first step we express the sum of these two parameters from 
equation (b). In the second step we use the estimated long-term relationship between λ  and  
ξ  from Bottazzi and Peri (2007) to approximate ϖ  separately. The authors do not estimate 
directly φ  and ϖ , however their estimated cointegration vector contains two coefficients  μ   
and  γ  , satisfying the following theoretical restrictions between the long-term coefficients of  






















The estimated values for these two coefficients show fairly big variations under the different 
regressions, and it might be inadequate to apply these long-term coefficients on our 

















term vary less, furthermore, imposing the ratio of the long-term parameters instead 
of their exact values is also less restrictive. To approximate our  ϖ   for the EU27, we use the 
ratio of these parameters from the specification in which the authors omitted the US from 
their regressions
25. In the last step we subtract this value from the sum of  φ   and  ϖ   as we 
calculated from equation b earlier. Finally, we normalize the stock of domestic and foreign 
ideas to one and therefore the values for ν  and θ  can be obtained from expressions (a) and 
(e). 
 
A.2. Intermediate goods production 
The calibration of the parameters in intermediate goods production relies on the entry costs 
estimations of Djankov et al. (2002), and the estimations for R&D related subsidies ( ) 
A τ  of 
Warda (1996 and 2006). Given that we normalized the stock of domestic ideas to one ( ), 
equation (g) pins down the per firm quantity of intermediate goods production. The profit of a 
representative intermediate firm is determined by its production and the net mark-up of the 
sector
t A
26. All other variables given, the arbitrage equation e determines the rental rate of 
intangible capital, i . The B-indices published in Warda (2006) can be applied to calibrate  
A
t
                                                                                                                                                           
of    . The population growth     is obtained from EUKLEMS potential output calculations.  057 . 0 = A g n g




26 We use the net mark-up of the manufacturing sector calculated in EUKLEMS to obtain  θ  , the inverse of the 
gross mark-up in the intermediate sector. 
 
 
  51A τ  and  . Finally, we use the definition of equation (f) to obtain as residual the calibrated 






Appendix B. The tax treatment of intangible capital 
 
The model is formulated in such a way that statutory corporate tax rates, depreciation 
allowances and tax credits can be incorporated in the analysis. This section explains how the 
tax measures in the model relate to Warda's (1996) B-index which serves as a comprehensive 
measure of the tax treatment of R&D as, for example, advocated by the OECD. Algebraically 
the B index is equal to the after tax cost of a Euro expenditure on R&D, divided by one minus 
the corporate income tax rate ( ). Apart from the corporate income tax rate, the relevant tax 
parameters for an investor in R&D are the investment tax credit (
K t
τ ) and the present 
discounted value of depreciation allowances (A). Depreciation allowances depend on the 
corporate tax rate and the depreciation scheme for a specific investment good as defined in the 
national tax laws. Standard depreciation schemes are declining balance and straight line 
depreciation as well as combinations of both.  In the model we implicitly assume a declining 
balance scheme since it yields a simple representation for the user cost of capital. With a 
declining balance scheme, the present discounted value at period t of depreciation allowances 
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and one obtains the standard neoclassical user cost of capital (cc) when multiplying the B-
index with the sum of the real interest rate and the rate of depreciation. Using the definition of 
A it can be seen immediately that Warda's user cost approach can be linked directly to the user 
cost formula (7c') used in the model  
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  52Figure A. Simplified flow chart of the model 
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